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Abstract
When entering a new era of digital societies, a vast number of digital
footprints left by users becomes a new source of the economic good.
A heavy exploitation of Big data, artificial intelligence, cognitive com-
puting, amongst others, makes the data more valuable implying that
the risk to people’s privacy will be ever-increasing. Especially, when
their privacy decisions are confronted with various trade-o s while us-
ing online services. Then, it becomes problematic to precisely express
privacy preferences and estimate the potential risks of one’s disclosure
behaviour, which might lead to an uncertainty in privacy decision-
making. Moreover, depending on personal and contextual motives,
privacy behaviour in particular situations di ers from individual to
individual, thus creating a personalised need for privacy.
This thesis presents a privacy profile framework designed for the plat-
form for political participation which allows both to measure the citi-
zens’ privacy preferences and model their privacy profiles using fuzzy
clustering techniques. By applying Fuzzy C-means (FCM) and Par-
titioning Around Medoids (PAM) algorithms, fuzzy privacy profiles
are used in the architecture of privacy settings recommender system.
Additionally, two user-centric evaluations were performed to estimate
people’s perceptions of the privacy settings recommendations. The
results demonstrated that the adoption of the privacy settings rec-
ommendations depends on the personal characteristics of citizens, as
well as indicated an existence of the inconsistent privacy behaviour.
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Résumé
Avec l’avènement d’une nouvelle ère, celle de la société numérique,
les utilisateurs laissent derrière eux un grand nombre d’empreintes
numériques qui constituent la source d’un nouveau bien économique.
L’exploitation intensive du Big Data, de l’intelligence artificielle, de
l’informatique cognitive, pour ne citer que quelques exemples, donne
de la valeur aux données et en mÍme temps, augmente le risque
d’atteinte à la sphère privée des individus, en particulier, lorsque les
utilisateurs de services en ligne doivent faire face à des compromis
dans leurs décisions touchant à la vie privée. Pour l’utilisateur, il
devient alors problématique d’exprimer avec précision les préférences
relevant de sa sphère privée et d’estimer les risques potentiels liés à
leur divulgation, d’où l’incertitude dans la prise de décision touchant
à la vie privée. En outre, dans chaque situation particulière le com-
portement en matière de vie privée varie d’un individu à l’autre en
fonction de ses motivations personnelles et contextuelles, nécessitant
ainsi la personnalisation de la sphère privée adaptée à chaque individu.
Dans cette thèse, l’auteure présente un framework du profil de la
sphère privée, conçu pour la plateforme de participation politique.
Ce framework permet à la fois de mesurer les préférences du citoyen
et de modéliser son profil relevant de sa sphère privée en utilisant
les techniques de clustering flou. Par l’application des algorithmes
du Fuzzy C-means (FCM) et du Partitionnement Autour des Mé-
doïdes (PAM), les profils flous de la sphère privée sont utilisés dans
l’architecture d’un système de recommandation pour la configuration
des données d’ordre privé. Deux évaluations centrées sur l’utilisateur
ont été réalisées pour estimer la perception des individus vis-à-vis des
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recommandations sur la configuration du profil de la sphère privée.
Les résultats montrent que l’adoption des recommandations sur la
configuration du profil de la spèhre privée dépend des caractéristiques
personnelles du citoyen et révèle aussi l’existence d’un comportement
incohérent en matière de sphère privée.
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Kurzfassung
Im Zeitalter der digitalen Gesellschaft werden die digitalen Spuren,
die wir tagtäglich in grosser Zahl hinterlassen, zu einem ökonomischen
Faktor. Der Einsatz von Big-Data-Methoden, künstlicher Intelligenz,
Cognitive Computing usw. machen Daten noch wertvoller, womit sich
auch die Risiken für die Privatsphäre laufend erhöhen. Problematisch
wird es vor allem dann, wenn der Schutz der Privatsphäre im Kon-
flikt mit der Benützung von Online-Dienstleistungen steht. In solchen
Fällen wird es für die Nutzer besonders schwierig, potentielle Risiken
der Freigabe von vertraulichen Daten einzuschätzen, was zu Unsicher-
heiten bei Datenschutz-Entscheiden führen kann. Kommt hinzu, dass
das Datenschutzverhalten von persönlichen und kontextuellen Mo-
tiven abhängt und daher von Person zu Person unterschiedlich sein
kann, weshalb ein personalisierten Schutz der Privatsphäre nötig wird.
Die vorliegende Dissertation stellt ein Privacy Setting Framework
vor, das für eine Plattform für politische Partizipation entwickelt
wurde. Es ermöglicht es, die Präferenzen der Bürger bezüglich des
Schutzes ihrer Privatsphäre zu schätzen und deren Datenschutzpro-
file mittels Fuzzy-Clustering-Methoden zu modellieren. Unter An-
wendung der Algorithmen Fuzzy C-means (FCM) und Partitioning
Around Medoids (PAM) werden Datenschutzprofile für die Architek-
tur eines Systems zur Empfehlung von personalisierten Datenschutze-
instellungen verwendet. Zusätzlich werden zwei anwenderzentrierte
Evaluationen durchgeführt, um die Wahrnehmung der Datenschutz
Empfehlungen durch die Nutzer zu messen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen,
dass die Akzeptanz von Datenschutz Empfehlungen von den persön-
lichen Eigenschaften des einzelnen Bürgers abhängt. Sie weisen eben-
falls auf die Existenz von inkonsistentem Verhalten der Nutzer hin,
wenn es um den Schutz der eigenen Privatsphäre geht.
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Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Westin [1968] defined the individual’s privacy right as when “each individual is
continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the
desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself
to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the
society in which he lives”. After five decades this definition is a still vivid reality.
However, the major di erence nowadays is that social norms are set by digital
societies, where the personal desire for disclosure can be expressed via privacy
controls as designed by online service providers.
Moreover, a human’s preferences are often ill-defined (Bettman et al. [1998]),
as is their ability to navigate the risks and benefits of information disclosure in
di erent contexts. In the digitalised world every piece of personal information
might become sensitive information. On one hand, there are plenty of online in-
formation systems ready to collect citizens’ personal data, however, on the other,
citizens, though having control over their personal information, are increasingly
exposing their data. This relates to the control paradox which shows that more
online control for privacy makes people more likely to reveal information about
themselves (Brandimarte et al. [2013]).
Even if people are stating that they want privacy, their actions are saying
otherwise. Such inconsistent behaviour is termed as privacy paradox (Norberg
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et al. [2007]). People can easily give up their personal data, for instance, for the
alimentary rewards by neglecting associated privacy risks. People seem to lack
concern with privacy, until receiving an appropriate notice. Technology services
might take advantages of such low privacy-aware behaviour of users: unprece-
dented collection of data (e.g., cell-phone location, click-streams, credit card use,
etc.), selling this data to entities interested in obtaining this information. Con-
sidering the complicated human’s privacy decision-making nature, the motivation
of this thesis focuses on the analysis of people’s privacy behaviour in the context
of online political platform, in particular, how to quantify their privacy attitudes
and how to generate privacy settings recommendations which might positively
impact their future desire for disclosure.
1.2 Objectives
To address these listed issues, this Ph.D. thesis proposes an information system
design that supports citizens to regulate their privacy boundaries in the online en-
vironment for political participation. The objective of this Ph.D. research aims at
developing a conceptual framework and intelligent engine that enhances citizens’
privacy in e-Democracy application by generating personalised privacy recom-
mendations. The application of fuzzy logic techniques is proposed in order to
facilitate the accuracy and utility of intelligent privacy recommendations.
1.3 Research Questions
In this section, a number of research questions are presented that provide an
overview of the goals and scope of this Ph.D. thesis. The motivation relevant to
each research question and the methods applied are discussed below.
In order to measure people’s privacy attitudes and other factors that influence
their desire of disclosure it is important to define a measurement privacy frame-
work within a chosen application context. Therefore, the first research question
is: “RQ1. How can a user privacy profile be designed on a platform for politi-
cal participation?”. Several research methods were used to answer this question.
First, through an extensive literature review approach, the critical points of the
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current knowledge, theoretical and methodological recommendations are reviewed
(see Chap. 2). Second, to explicate a design of the preferred information system,
a conceptual framework is presented (see Chap. 3).
The analysis of users’ disclosure tendencies and their privacy decision-making
depends on the chosen quantification tools. This thesis proposed an alternative
approach for classification of people’s privacy preferences by means of fuzzy clus-
tering which have been applied for the first time in the existing research field.
Thus, the second research question addresses: “RQ2. How do fuzzy clustering
techniques unveil users’ disclosure behaviour on a political platform?”. As appli-
cation field of privacy issues is broad enough (e.g., health-, insurance-, education-,
etc. related privacy), the application of the case study method is relevant in this
thesis. The case study research method provides an in-depth investigation of the
focal context, individual, group or event. This thesis addresses the online po-
litical participation context of the citizens of Ecuador using an online platform
called the Participa Inteligente 1 during presidential elections period. In addition,
having the models of user privacy preferences build upon fuzzy clustering, the fol-
lowing user privacy decision support is regarded as the next research question of
the thesis: “RQ3. How can an architecture for a fuzzy-based recommender system
for privacy settings be designed?”. For this question, the prototyping method was
applied as a basis for the proof of the proposed conceptual framework.
There are many solutions exist to solve the aforementioned motivation of this
research. The success of the proposed solution depends not only on its distinctive
advantages, but also on the kind of limitations that follow with implementation
of such a solution. With this in mind, the fourth research question is: “RQ4.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of applying fuzzy-based approaches in
user privacy-decision making?”. To answer this question the evaluation methods
in a form of a structured interviews are conducted. In particular a user-centric
evaluation approach is developed to answer the aforementioned question. The sta-
tistical analysis provides the quantitative interpretation of the collected dataset
during this evaluation, and relevant conclusions are derived.
1https://participacioninteligente.org/
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1.4 Research Methods
In alignment with defined research questions and perspective research methods,
the general methodology of the entire Ph.D. thesis is based on the design-science
research approach proposed by Von Alan et al. [2004]. Fig. 1.1 displays the general
research framework of the design science approach adapted for the undertaken
research of this Ph.D. thesis. The advantageous characteristic of the research
using design-science approach is that the research outcome (artefacts) provides
contribution not only to the application of the knowledge base (add-on to the
theory), but also to the application in the appropriate environment (add-on solu-
tion to the practical issue). Von Alan et al. [2004] stated that the design science
intends to solve identified organizational problems through creation and evalu-
ation of IT artefacts. The kind of artefacts may be represented as constructs,
models, methods and instantiations. To that, this research aimed to produce two
artefacts: the first artefact – a citizen privacy profile framework in a form of a
model (see Chap. 3, Sect. 3.1.2) and the second artifact – a fuzzy-based privacy
recommender system prototype in a form of a construct (see Chap. 4, Sect. 4.1.2),
and a web-based application (see Chap. 4, Sect. 4.2). The research of this thesis
lies in the field of information systems (IS) which is an applied research discipline.
The theories of other disciplines, for instance, economics, computer science and
social sciences, are often combined in an IS discipline to solve problems at the
intersection of information technology and organization (Pe ers et al. [2007]).
Figure 1.1: Adapted framework of the Ph.D. research (adapted from Von Alan et al. [2004])
4
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1.5 Thesis Outline
This thesis is organised in to five chapters, with each chapter containing di er-
ent sections. Following the introduction, the second chapter provides an in-depth
literature background; the third is dedicated to the citizen’s privacy profile frame-
work; the forth describes the implementation of fuzzy-based privacy settings rec-
ommender system; and, finally, the fifth chapter summarises concluding remarks
and future outlooks.
Chapter 2 - Insights into Privacy Research. This chapter introduces
privacy as a concept based on the existing body of research. By presenting
privacy as a paradoxical concept with underlying reasons for that, this chapter
further reviews researchers’ attempts to frame privacy within behavioural eco-
nomic theory considering the user as a rational human. Reaching beyond the
limits of user’s decision-making rationality, the chapter then discusses the human
cognition factors involved during the user privacy decision-making process. Fi-
nally, the chapter outlines existing research communities that are engaged with
research projects that focus on privacy enhancing technologies.
Chapter 3 - Citizen Privacy Profile Framework. This chapter is ded-
icated to the conceptual framework of this Ph.D. thesis. Based on the extensive
literature review, the chapter demonstrates a derived conceptual model of the
existing research and placement of own contribution to the thesis. After, the
conceptual framework of citizen privacy profile framework for Voting Advice Ap-
plications (VAAs) is introduced. Addressing the problem of privacy as an am-
biguous and uncertain concept, this chapter promotes a possible importance and
e ciency of using fuzzy logic in the development of privacy enhancing technolo-
gies. Thus, the implementation phases of the proposed citizen profile framework
are presented. In particular, the development of the privacy management tool on
the platform is described; the collection of the real-world dataset of user privacy
profiles and analysis of the dataset structure is presented. User privacy profiles
modelling is based on two di erent fuzzy clustering algorithms (fuzzy c-means,
partitioning around medoids). The validation of fuzzy clustering results are ex-
plained. The evaluation of users’ privacy behaviour on the platform is discussed
to understand if there was a privacy paradox e ect, if users’ actual behaviour
5
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diverges with initial privacy attitudes and what are the reasons of using default
settings.
Chapter 4 - Fuzzy-based Privacy Settings Recommender System.
This chapter introduces the fuzzy-based privacy settings recommender system.
Along with a system architecture, this chapter describes the algorithm for calcu-
lating privacy recommendations with di erent distance metrics. The evaluation
of the accuracy of the proposed models have been presented. This chapter also
discusses the user evaluation of privacy recommendations, showing to what ex-
tent privacy recommendations are adapted by users and if recommendations were
found useful.
Chapter 5 - Conclusions. In this chapter, concluding remarks and limi-
tations of the current research are discussed. Further suggestions for the future
research directions are outlined.
1.6 Own research contribution
In this section, a summary of the technical contributions and the list of the papers
published by the author of this dissertation are provided. These resources are all
related to the motivation or a part of this thesis.
• Kaskina A. Exploring nuances of user privacy preferences on a platform
for political participation. In this work, the fuzzy c-means algorithm was
applied to demonstrate the multidimensionality and the existence of fuzzy
user privacy profiles, where the user at once can be associated with di erent
privacy behaviour classes. It is based on the collected real-world dataset of
user privacy profiles from Participa Inteligente platform (Kaskina [2018a]).
• Meier A., Kaskina A., Teran L. Politische Partizipation – eSociety anders
gedacht. In this work, the authors discuss the pyramid of political partici-
pation, explain the process chain for eVoting and eElection and introduce a
recommendation system for electronic voting and elections that uses fuzzy
logic. The protection of citizens’ privacy is regulated in a privacy setting
framework. In addition, it will be shown how political controlling could be
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introduced and how public memory could be successively built up (Meier
et al. [2018]).
• Kaskina A. Di erentiated User Privacy Support in the Digital Society. This
work proposes the concept of the di erentiated user privacy framework
which utilises a fuzzy inference system to create adaptive support for digital
citizens in their privacy decision-making processes. It further presents the
implementation of the user privacy profile part for VAA in Ecuador, includ-
ing the development of functionalities such as information disclosure; the
social network management functionality; the sharing techniques (Kaskina
[2017]).
• Recalde L. and Kaskina A. Who is suitable to be followed back when you
are a Twitter interested in Politics? The degree of citizens participation
and political involvement within democratic societies may vary from one
person to another. Similarly, the diversity of political engagement of users
might be observed in online platforms. This paper proposed a framework
to identify the level of interest in politics of a Twitter user for further design
of the following back recommender system (Recalde & Kaskina [2017]).
• Kaskina A. and Meier A. Integrating privacy and trust in voting advice
applications. In this paper, the authors explored the multidimensionality of
user privacy behaviours based on the present user profile privacy framework.
Authors showed that the complexity of user privacy profiles is reflected in
variance of privacy decision per di erent data item in accordance with an
audience representative (Kaskina & Meier [2016]).
• Kaskina A. and Radovanovic N. How to Build Trust-Aware Voting Advice
Applications? Voting advice applications (VAAs) are intelligent systems
that provide personalized recommendations of a political candidate/party
to a voter with regard to their political attitudes. The paper presents a
trust-aware Voting Advice Application which aims to improve the recom-
mendation accuracy and to facilitate voter’s decision-making processes and
enhance citizens’ participation (Kaskina & Radovanovic [2016]).
• Teran L. and Kaskina A. Enhancing voting advice applications with dy-
namic profiles. This paper presents a research of recommender systems ap-
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plied on e-Government, particularly as it is an extension of VAAs. Authors
introduce the use of fuzzy profiles that include both static and dynamic
components. The dynamic profile generation contains di erent elements,
such as context-aware information and privacy and trust concerns of users
in order to provide di erent types of output recommendations and visual-
izations. Then, the system architecture and a prototype implementation of
the extended VAA platform are presented (Terán & Kaskina [2016]).
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Insights into Privacy Research
2.1 Economics of privacy – a rational human
2.1.1 Privacy calculus
Solove [2006] states that privacy cannot be considered independently from soci-
ety, as “a need for privacy is a socially created need”. Privacy is a challenging,
vague and multifaceted concept, however, for decades researchers from social,
psychological and computer science disciplines were focused on various aspects
of privacy interpretation and conceptualisation. Altman [1977] tackles privacy
as behavioural mechanisms used to regulate desired levels of privacy that occurs
in all cultures. Altman defines privacy functions as: management of social in-
teraction; establishment of plans and strategies for interacting with others; and
development and maintenance of self-identity.
Palen & Dourish [2003] develop further Altman’s understanding of privacy as
a dialectic and dynamic boundary regulation process in the context of evolved
information technologies. Authors propose a characterisation of privacy manage-
ment scoped by three types of boundaries: the disclosure boundary that deter-
mines tensions between privacy and publicity; maintenance of self-identity; and
temporality of boundaries defining the past, present and future interpretation of
the disclosed information that could be in tension. It is upon the individual’s
decision to what extent the desired level of privacy is maintained.
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Laufer & Wolfe [1977] present a privacy calculus behavior outlined into three
aspects: “individuals may engage in various behaviors believing that they can
manage the information in new and later situations and thus minimize the po-
tential consequences; individuals may simply not do certain things because the
ability to manage the information at some later, even distant, point is unpre-
dictable, or because even at the present moment the publicness or privateness of
the act is ambiguously defined; the calculus of behavior is related to the emer-
gence of new technologies and the stage of the life cycle”. Such interpretation
of privacy calculus evolves from the author’s conceptualization of privacy dimen-
sions. Laufer &Wolfe [1977] base privacy on the situationality of the socio-historic
environment in which the person grows over time throughout her life cycle.
Posner [1978] addresses privacy from a simple economic theory perspective
where he defines two economic goods: “privacy” which is associated with infor-
mation and facts about people that will incur costs to the information owner
in order to withhold it; and “prying” related to people who are interested in
other’s people information which will also incur costs in order to discover it. The
disclosure of one’s information, according to Posner, is operated as transaction
costs and, depending on the nature of the source of information, the costs may
vary. By providing several examples of privacy as a good, and disclosure act as
a transaction cost within individual’s right of privacy, Posner, however, supports
organizational privacy as, according to him, it has a greater economical impact
rather than personal privacy.
Decades after, Acquisti & Grossklags [2005] also interpret people’s privacy
attitudes and behaviours through the lens of economic theories. Authors state
that during privacy decision making people’s minds are framed with bounded
rationality which is accompanied by situational externalities, information asym-
metries, risks and uncertainties. Authors refer to the economical concept of “time
inconsistent discounting”, placing an example when an individual can easily fall
for an instant low reward (short-term estimation) by disclosing some information
without considering potential future negative implications (long-term estimation)
of such disclosure. People are willing to act according to their own privacy inter-
ests, but due to complexity of privacy benefit/costs calculations, people naturally
need to use simpler models that, ultimately, appear to be less beneficial for them.
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Considering privacy through the lens of economic terms and privacy calculus
leads to a capitalistic attitude towards one’s privacy where businesses will excel
at their best to motivate individuals to disclose as much information as possible.
However, using simplistic benefits and costs model to target the best match of
people’s privacy attitudes and behaviours will not be enough. The privacy is
not only complex in obtaining rational decision-making calculations, but is also
bundled with psychological, cognitive and contextual cues. Thus, the critics of
the economic view of privacy is discussed in the following section.
2.1.2 Death to privacy calculus?
Acquisti & Grossklags [2005] mention a “notice and choice” approach applied to
establish benefits/costs relationships between customers and businesses. Sloan
& Warner [2014] explains that the notice is a presentation of a business’ terms
(privacy policy or terms of use agreement), while the choice is an action signifying
acceptance of these terms (clicking on an “I agree” button or proceeding using
the website). Although being widely spread for several decades as an underlying
mechanism for information protection and privacy self-management, the “notice
and choice” approach is heavily criticised.
Hull [2015] argues that people are unable to make rational choices, where no-
tice and choice strategy fails to provide a legible explanation of the privacy value.
Economical perception of privacy treats it as a product, thus, increasing the pri-
vacy consumerism and neglecting a more social understanding of privacy. Hull
[2015] proposes to understand privacy-protective behaviour as a form of resistance
and of an e ort “to refuse what we are” against those who have the power to im-
pinge over our privacy. However, he points out that privacy self-management
is mostly considered not as a resistance towards one’s privacy preservation but
treats preservation control as a “commercial transaction”, and then considers this
transactions as an expression of “consumer preferences”. Thus, “the privacy self-
management model obscures a social struggle, repackaging it as a well-functioning
market.”
Moreover, Solove [2013] encourages researchers, policy and law makers to start
looking beyond the privacy self-management and to focus on consent dilemma.
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In particular, Solove highlights that any privacy self-management solution must
confront a complex dilemma with consent. He draws attention to two main as-
pects that fail to make better use of privacy self-management solutions: cognitive
and structural problems. The former one concerns the challenges on how humans
make privacy decisions, fostered by the problem of uninformed individuals and
further reinforced by the skewed decision-making. The latter addresses the struc-
ture of the privacy self-management tools that impedes its own goal of giving
meaningful control over users’ data.
In his paper “Death to privacy calculus?”, Knijnenburg et al. [2017] poses
under the question the practicality and ethicality of privacy calculus. Authors
highlight that the contextualised anticipatory nature of privacy is far too complex
to be handled solely upon privacy calculus, and that notice and choice together
with privacy nudging, though being justifiable and ethical solutions, shortfall in
providing enough protection. Authors propose a user-tailored privacy by design
approach where the model of risk-benefit is a central part that consider which
variables to include to su ciently address the context. In that way, the system
provides an automated support for users’ privacy decision-making. Although
the automation simplifies users’ privacy decisions, one should not neglect if the
model’s trade-o  is compensatory or not, which again can lead to the Hull’s
argument of the privacy consumerism.
2.1.3 Privacy paradox
The gap between privacy attitude and actual disclosure behaviour is influenced by
di erent types of rewards and benefits. In this vein, Hui et al. [2006] have studied
several types of benefits and factors that motivate users to disclose their personal
information. They outline seven types of benefits, categorised into extrinsic and
intrinsic types, and investigate how those types of motivators can influence users
to disclose more or less information. Hui et al. [2006] indicate that aside from
the popular extrinsic benefits such as monetary saving or time saving benefits,
various types of intrinsic benefits, such as social adjustment, novelty or altruism,
when used appropriately, can also motivate users to engage in online disclosure.
The disclosure behaviour can di er between individuals depending on their
12
Economics of privacy – a rational human
respective personal motives. Nevertheless, people tend to show similar disclosure
tendencies to each other. An interesting inclination in people’s privacy behaviour
has been presented in Norberg et al. [2007]. “Privacy paradox” stated to be a
disclosure behaviour when people’s intention to limit their disclosure fades away
at their e ectuated disclosure act. Norberg et al. [2007] hypothesise that the gap
between intentional and actual disclosure behaviour is product of two factors: it is
a risk that, at first, substantially influences the individual’s intention to disclose,
while at the end it is a trust factor that significantly influences the individual’s
actual disclosure behaviour.
The existence of privacy paradox behaviour signals the departure from human-
minded rationality. Compañó & Lusoli [2010] conducted a large scale online sur-
vey study among young Europeans in regards to perceptions and acceptance of
risks, general motivations, attitudes and behaviours concerning electronic iden-
tity. Their study highlights the prevalence of privacy paradox where people with
high perception of privacy risks still disclosed a range of personal information.
The recent study by Athey et al. [2017] a rms the existence of the privacy para-
dox, discovered in a study where people’s behaviour was observed in the digital
(online information system) environment. Authors suggested that relying solely
on disclosure behaviour can be misguiding. The results showed that despite stated
privacy preferences, when given a small incentive the promised intentional disclo-
sure disappears. Moreover, they found that additional e ort costs seem to trigger
the “laziness”, so that users might fall back from their initial privacy-protective
choices due to complexity and e ort-demanding privacy controls.
In a digitalised world people are disclosing more and more personal informa-
tion online. Besides the aforementioned concept of “privacy paradox”, people
are also confronted with various privacy compromises and trade-o s (e.g., “take
it or leave it”, “benefits and costs trade-o ” and “privacy and personalisation
trade-o ”). With that, it becomes more di cult for people’s minds to estimate
implying risks in their disclosure behaviour. Moreover, one’s privacy management
strategies are not always e ectively performed. For example, a non-user-friendly
design of privacy controls presents to be a barrier for users in e ectively main-
taining their desired level of privacy (Johnson et al. [2012]; Kelley et al. [2011b];
Reinhardt et al. [2015]; Watson et al. [2012]).
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2.2 Beyond rationality – human cognition
2.2.1 Cognitive heuristics behind disclosure decisions
Why does recent research suggest viewing privacy beyond the rational mind and
to step away from the economic interpretation of privacy decisions? Researchers
are convinced that simplified economic models of benefits and costs produce a
distorted reality regarding people’s privacy attitudes. Problems of skewed dis-
closure decisions with involved cognitive, psychological heuristics a ects a well-
established utopia of having a rational user. That is a why a self-management
approaches fail at the face of privacy paradox, as important underlying cognitive
behaviours and biases are overlooked.
Lai & Hui [2006] suggest that framing questions in certain formats may un-
consciously evoke higher levels of consumer participation. Authors discuss two
default mechanisms, such as opt-in and opt-out, in the context of choice frame
(e.g., “notify me about more health surveys”) and rejection frame (e.g., “do not
notify me about more health surveys”). Authors find that users with high pri-
vacy concerns experience positive and favourable attitudes towards participation
in online activities when presented with the relevant choice-frame.
Marmion et al. [2017] investigate which cognitive heuristics drive people while
making disclosure decision and how it impacts their further behaviour. The au-
thors apply credibility-framed heuristics which are divided into several classes
(prominence, network, reliability, etc.) in a qualitative user study, by reporting
results on how a particular heuristic has an impact on users’ disclosure behaviour.
For example, network heuristic shows that people tend to delegate their privacy
decisions by relying on the recommendations of peers expecting others in con-
ducting risk discovery for a particular disclosure decision. Authors conclude that
instead of rational decision based on benefits and costs model, users are inclined
to estimate trustworthiness based upon prominence and social network heuris-
tics, relying on cues such as popularity, brand exposure or word of mouth which
fundamentally lead to a “herd mentality”.
Similarly, Gambino et al. [2016] find that in a moment of disclosure behaviour
users form their decisions based on “interface-cue triggered cognitive heuristics”.
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Authors outline several “positive heuristics” that encourage users to disclose their
information as they supply the feeling of safety. As an example, gatekeeping
heuristic invokes the sense of safety when the web services provides many layers
of access (e.g., banking system with several steps of authorisation), and it mostly
appeared in relation to sensitive data like banking, health information, etc. How-
ever, when appeared in less valuable websites like Facebook, multi-layers of access
were deemed annoying. Authors also identify “negative heuristics” which, instead,
inhibit users disclosure decisions lead by the distrust to a website. intrusiveness
heuristic appears when users are provided with unsolicited items and, when users
realise that their data has been used by third parties without their consent, it
evokes a negative e ect resulting in restraining their sharing behavior.
Years prior, Camp [2009] stated that the lack of privacy protective technolo-
gies adoption is partially due to ine ective risk communication arguing that “if
naive users are unable to e ectively evaluate their own risks and decisions, no
amount of technology will be empowering for those users.” The author draws
attention to users tending to fail at understanding detailed risk communication
which brings uncertainty. Consequently, users fall upon heuristics and biases in
estimating risks. The use of mental models proved to be e ective for uncertain
decision making in various domains. The author presents di erent situational
cases (physical security, medical infection, economic failure, etc.) exposing secu-
rity risk communications and what mental models appear to be present. Thus,
the author concludes that mental models are more natural to people’s mind in
perceiving the risk, admitting that strictly rational approach is, in fact, irrational.
The argument in common drawn by the above-mentioned studies and others
(Kang et al. [2015]; Kehr et al. [2015]; Sundar et al. [2013]) is that the utopian
assumption of a rational user capable of making privacy decision in uncertain
environment is an illusion. The physical privacy is understood to be result of
physical or tactical risk-avoidance behaviour, while online privacy is harder to
understand, therefore, there is a greater uncertainty in decision-making(Camp
[2009]). An unshaped definition of privacy and vague representation of implied
risks and benefits do not permit users at their calculative skills make a rational
decision, thus, leading to use cognitive abilities, such as heuristics, or to trigger
psychological biases.
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2.2.2 Enforced by individual characteristics?
The cognitive heuristics are not limited to psychological biases and perceptions.
Individual characteristics are apparent to be complementary factors that influence
people’s disclosure behaviour. Demographical di erences, personality peculiari-
ties and social status, among others, are shown to explicate particular tendencies
of people’s privacy attitudes, intended and actual disclosure behaviour.
Cho et al. [2009] investigate individual characteristics and cultural factors that
a ect people’s online privacy concerns and influence their further privacy protec-
tion behaviour. According to individualism index (IND), based on Hofstede’s
framework, a person from individualistic countries tend to value the private life
more than a someone from a collectivistic country where the intrusion of groups
or an organisation is accepted. A study by Sawaya et al. [2017] supports the
previous study and shows that Asian users (China, Japan, South Korea, etc.) are
likely to exhibit less private behaviour online and to be less concerned with on-
line privacy. In addition, Li et al. [2017] postulate that people from collectivistic
countries (China, India, etc.) find it acceptable to disclose personal information
to the government or employers as they tend to “subjugate individual rights and
goals for a sense of commitment to the group and of self-sacrifice for the common
good”. In contrast, people from individualistic countries (US, Germany, etc.)
deem such behavior unacceptable as they feel less obligated to disclose personal
information if there is no specific demand. They are more willing to disclose for
paid services or for services with a pre-existing relationship to the service. With
respect to gender characteristics, earlier studies indicate that female users tend to
have higher privacy concerns and e ectuate privacy protective behaviours rather
than their younger male equivalent (Cho et al. [2009]; Lewis et al. [2008]). How-
ever, a recent study showes that women self-disclose more than men on social
networking site, for example Facebook (Wang et al. [2016]), while the study by
Sawaya et al. [2017] indicates that there is no e ect of gender on people’s security
behaviour. Also, this study reports that the income level has an e ect, so that
people with an income level of at least 60K$ (USD) per year have more diligent
security behaviours when compared to those with an income lower than 60K$
(USD) per year.
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For the individual’s personality e ect, early studies have investigated the re-
lationship of personality and privacy preferences in o ine environment. Marshall
[1970] and Pedersen [1987] identified a highly similar set of privacy dimensions
and described how personality determines peoples’ privacy preferences. Marshall
found a correlation between person’s introversion and her total privacy score,
while Pedersen highlighted that low self-esteem was associated with solitude and
anonymity. Considering privacy disclosure in an online environment, Ferwerda
et al. [2016]; Quercia et al. [2012] using a Big Five personality measurement clas-
sified users and found that privacy conscious users are correlated with traits as
openness and extraversion, and non-disclosure behaviour correlates with various
personality characteristics depending on the data type. However, in their study
Schrammel et al. [2009] reported that they could not find any significant relations
between personality traits and information disclosure. In contrast, Egelman &
Peer [2015] argued that personal traits, such as decision-making and risk-taking
attitudes, are much stronger predictors for privacy attitudes than the traditional
Big Five personality model.
Attempts undertaken by researchers to deconstruct the concept of privacy
shows that the snowball composed of psychological and cognitive antecedents,
individual di erences and contextual cues, among others, makes it di cult to
develop a universal framework. The main focus of this thesis lies in the argument
heuristics in privacy decision-making must be accounted in the design of privacy
profile frameworks and in automated privacy decisions support systems. This
thesis makes a first attempt to address the cognitive nature of privacy decision-
making by embedding fuzzy clustering approaches described later in the thesis.
2.3 Automating user privacy support
Due to the complexity of privacy controls it becomes problematic for people to
precisely express their privacy preferences and estimate the potential risks of their
disclosure behavior. For example, Kelley et al. [2011a] found that users on Face-
book are adapting their online behaviour to avoid the need to specify groups in
the current Facebook interface. Whereas, in the case of Google+ circles, Watson
et al. [2012] demonstrate that some participants still posted information with
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the expectation that the content could possibly be seen by anybody regardless
of being able to share with a particular audience. To mitigate some of the exist-
ing privacy issues a privacy by design (PbD) regulation has been introduced by
Cavoukian [2012]. PbD is characterised by proactive measures to improve one’s
privacy. It suggests that privacy aspect of the information system should be em-
bedded earlier in the design phase of the information system. Below, the overview
of leading research institutions that undertake scientifically justified actions to
support users’ privacy in line with privacy by design approach is presented.
Carnegie Mellon University, USA. Usable privacy policy project1 focus on
addressing the problem of privacy policies which is usually left unread by users.
This project aims to develop machine implementable standards and techniques
that will help semi-automatically extract key privacy policy features from natural
language website privacy policies. Further, these features are presented “to users
in an easy-to-digest format that enables them to make more informed privacy
decisions as they interact with di erent websites.”
Berkley Laboratory for Usable and Experimental Security, USA.2.
The goal of the research lab is to understand how users perceive various smartphone-
related risks, their preferences for how their sensitive data should be used by
third-party applications and the threat to the landscape. In addition, the re-
search on web-based threats to privacy and security involves performing human
subject experiments to examine how people respond to current mitigations, such
as web browser security warnings and various privacy tools.
Clemson University, USA. The Privacy support for total learning archi-
tecture3 project applies user-tailored privacy by design which, in essence, predicts
users’ privacy preferences and behaviours and then provides adaptive nudges. In
such personalised privacy decision support, machine learning techniques take over
risk/benefit trade-o , context, users characteristics and other variables, so that
decreasing users’ decision burden over their privacy protection.
EPFL, Switzerland. Researchers at EPFL developed PriBot – the first au-
tomated question-answering chatbot for privacy policies and Polisis – a unique
1https://usableprivacy.org/
2https://blues.cs.berkeley.edu/
3https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316065621
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way of visualizing privacy policies. Using deep learning algorithms, these applica-
tions allows users to know what data the company is collecting and if it is shared
with third parties, so that decreasing users’ e ort to read and understand the
entire text of privacy policies.
SOCIAM, England. The mobile app X-Ray project aims to help end-users
make better informed privacy decisions by making the hidden information flows
within and behind social machines visible. In particular, Data Controller Indica-
tors were developed that expose previously hidden information flows out of the
web applications. Such indicators support people in making more confident and
consistent choices, informed by the number and nature of third-party companies
that access users’ data (Van Kleek et al. [2017]).
University of Fribourg, Switzerland. The Ph.D. project titled “A Fuzzy-
Based User Privacy Framework and Recommender System: Case of a Platform
for Political Participation”. This project considers the Participa Inteligente’s
platform – a main function of which is to serve as a voting advice application.
The aim is to develop privacy support for online citizens by using a combination
of fuzzy clustering and recommender system techniques. Essentially, based on
the real-world dataset from the citizens of Ecuador, the core of the proposed
approach can be later applied within di erent cultural and application domains.
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Citizen Privacy Profile Framework
3.1 Conceptual development
3.1.1 Overview of existing privacy frameworks
Grounded on the design science research process and the literature review of
the existing body of knowledge, the current and own research contribution was
framed into a model as displayed on Fig. 3.1. A broad research framework was
developed that identified the critical variables for measurements derived from
various and existing privacy frameworks (Aïmeur et al. [2009]; Liu & E.Terzi
[2010]). Once the privacy framework is defined, the subsequent step was to build
privacy profiles (Kobsa [2001]) of users which, in earlier research, were quantified
as unidimensional profiles (Westin [1968]). The first substantial improvement was
achieved when researchers moved from “one-size fits all approach” and started
to quantify privacy profiles across several dimensions – multidimensional profiles
(Knijnenburg et al. [2013]; Wisniewski et al. [2017]). The fact that people’s pri-
vacy attitudes may vary along di erent dimensions helps not only to di erentiate
between the implied context, but also to improve the personalisation of people’s
privacy attitudes and preferences. Once privacy profiles are defined, users are as-
signed to segmented groups with the help of various machine learning techniques.
This information is later used in the development of smart privacy management
tools or privacy-enhanced applications. The former tools aim to assist users’
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual model of the existing research and own contribution
personal privacy in the online environment, whilst the latter applications utilise
users’ privacy preferences to improve their own online services.
With regards the contribution of this thesis, Fig. 3.1 indicates that profiling
should move one step further towards the fuzzy profiles(Kaskina [2018a]), which
not only increases the accuracy of the user segmentation and personalisation but
also assists in capturing user’s cognitive perceptions of privacy. In turn, using
a fuzzy logic approach, including computing with words, fuzzy clustering, fuzzy
inference approach, among others, can significantly improve the segmentation of
privacy user groups and the development of smart privacy controls. In the fol-
lowing sections we discuss in detail some existing privacy frameworks and privacy
management tools, and then present the own privacy framework and fuzzy-based
privacy recommender system in the context of political participation. Below we
discuss the existing privacy frameworks addressed in the research domain. By
analysing their advantages and disadvantages, we introduce our privacy frame-
work designed for the Voting Advice Application as mentioned in Sect. 3.1.2.
Liu et al. framework
Liu & E.Terzi [2010] proposed a framework that takes into account privacy set-
tings of users with respect to their profile items. The framework computes privacy
scores of users using Item Response Theory (IRT), thus, estimating their potential
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privacy risks. The authors mathematically defined the sensitivity of the profile
item and the visibility parameter, which indicates how visible this item is to the
social network of the user. As IRT methodology is primarily used in psycho-
metrics, Liu & E.Terzi [2010] relates the examinee to a user, and questions to
profile items. The ability of the examinee is mapped to a user’s privacy attitude,
which is quantified by the level of the user’s privacy concern. Thus, they indicate
two types of users based on their privacy concerns: conservative/introverts and
careless/extraverts. By grouping set of users into groups based on their attitude
types, they calculate the sensitivity and visibility of profile items by scoring their
privacy risk.
Later, Munemasa & Iwaihara [2011] developed a visualisation tool of users’
privacy setting tendencies. In their work the authors apply the Liu & E.Terzi
[2010] framework to evaluate the openness level of user profile by assigning pri-
vacy scores. In this way, every user profile openness was classified based on
privacy score attitudes: introvert, extravert and the additional average attitude.
To conclude, the proposed IRT-based privacy framework can have several disad-
vantages. The sensitivity parameter was quantified as a “di culty parameter”
which takes values from a negative to positive infinite range. Such interpretation
of sensitivity is very uncertain and lacks the profile item context. Additionally,
the attitude score calculation is based on the sensitive parameter using likelihood
estimation. As a result, users attitudes are represented as a score, and the frame-
work implements one-dimensional clustering of users. Therefore, this framework
is a demonstrative example where users privacy is quantified as a unidimensional
profile by ignoring the multi-level openness degrees (granularity of visibility) and
downgrading the whole profile into one score.
Aimeur et al. framework
To enable users to communicate their privacy preferences before allowing access
to their data, Aïmeur et al. [2009] developed a privacy framework where users’ pri-
vacy preferences can be configured in a form of a “user privacy policy”. First, the
framework considers users’ privacy concerns which are grouped based on the se-
curity risk, reputation and credibility risk, profiling risk, etc. Second, the authors
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also identify profile viewers (people to whom the data is disclosed) which are cat-
egorised into best friends, normal friends, casual friends and visitors. Third, the
users’ data is also classified into categories related to the security risks. Then,
they derive users’ privacy levels (No Privacy, Soft Privacy, Hard Privacy, Full
Privacy) and tracking levels (Strong Tracking, Weak Tracking and No Tracking)
using the predefined categorisation of the data, the user privacy concerns and pro-
file viewers. Thus, by using “user privacy policy”, the data owners can grant the
access of the data only if the users, who request the access, follow their policy’s
conditions. In general, compared to previous work, Aïmeur et al. [2009] frame-
work presents to be more contextualised. For example, user’s privacy attitude
(concern) quantification is based on several dimensions as well as profile viewers
being categorised into definitive group types. However, both, privacy levels and
tracking levels, were limited to a static configuration that cannot fully charac-
terise each user’s personal “taste” of privacy settings. To that, users are invited
to configure the suitable privacy policy themselves. This is a drawback of this
framework as it requires substantial user e ort and time to conduct an extensive
privacy calculus to perform their own configuration. Even though the framework
aims to inform and facilitate one’s privacy control, there is a possibility that, over
time, the user might experience a significant “configuration fatigue”.
Knijnenburg et al. framework
Knijnenburg et al. [2013] argue that user privacy behaviour while disclosing per-
sonal information appears to have not just one “disclosure tendency”, but several.
Opposingly, the user privacy behaviour classification should move from the “one-
size-fits-all” approach, thus, considering people’s privacy behaviour per various
dimensions. A multidimensional conceptualisation of privacy behaviours will not
only provide a more robust measurement of users’ privacy, but also give more pre-
cise classification of groups of people, thus, supporting them to tailor their privacy.
Based on these arguments, Knijnenburg [2017] presents a user-tailored privacy
framework. This framework aims to shape out an optimal solution for users’
privacy support by considering the multidimensional nature of people’s privacy
behaviours and contextual variables. It considers context-specific variables which
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focus on the context of the requested data, personal user’s characteristics, fea-
tures of the data recipients and other system-specific factors. Undoubtedly, this
framework goes beyond simplified versions of privacy frameworks by proposing
three steps for a personalised privacy: 1) measure user’s privacy-related charac-
teristics and behaviours; 2) use the output from first step to build a user privacy
model; and 3) adapt systems privacy settings according to inferred privacy pref-
erences. One of the possible pitfalls of such a framework is that while capturing
its optimality, the practical feasibility is weakly addressed. Even though it is
contextually enriched, in a real-world scenario it becomes more complicated to
practically build such architectures. Thus, a potential drawback of this frame-
work is a missing detailed specification of each part of the framework. In Sect. 4.1,
we will discuss existing technical implementations of privacy frameworks which
aim to provide an intelligent automated user privacy control.
3.1.2 Citizen privacy profile framework (CPP)
To the best of our knowledge, none of the past studies focused on developing the
privacy framework specifically to the needs of Voting Advice Applications (VAAs).
It is vital for political platforms, like VAAs, to be concerned with a citizens’ desire
to position themselves on the platform with respect to their expressed privacy
preferences. VAAs are heavily associated with a political context, where citizens
may be exposed to various privacy risks. Those risks linked to the underlying
context of politics may a ect the disclosure behaviour strategies of users.
As an example, in their study, Huckfeldt & Sprague [1987] show that voters
tend to be accurate in their perceptions of discussion partners who agree with their
own preferences, e.g. Reagan voters tend to recognize other Reagan voters. This
is especially the case when surrounding environment preferences are supportive
of the voter’s preferences. Reagan voters are more likely to perceive Mondale
discussants accurately in Mondale surrounding contexts and less likely to perceive
them accurately in Reagan surrounding contexts. Put di erently, members of the
political minority accurately perceive members of the majority, while members of
the majority do not accurately perceive members of the minority (Huckfeldt &
Sprague [1987]). This behaviour can advise the need of the system functionality
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to create groups on the platform which can provide the opportunity for private
discussions among users with similar political views.
An exposure to diverse political views within political discussion networks does
not necessarily enhance political communication activities. According to Kwon
et al. [2015], being exposed to varied political opinions may induce an uncertainty
in one’s own political beliefs, leading them to hesitancy to publicly claim their
political positions, thus avoiding political participation. However, the study of
Kim [2011] manifests that those people who actively use social networking sites
and active on online political messaging are mostly those who faced to cross-
cutting political discussion, i.e. political di erence. This theoretical background
can inform the design of citizen privacy profile framework, in particular, the
design of the functionality that will allow to disclose or to hide user’s political
opinions which will facilitate to manage one’s relations within her social network
and by personal volition to avoid or engage in the diverse political discussions.
Voting Advice Applications
In the field of e-Democracy the emerging tools called Voting Advice Applications
(VAAs) are gaining great interest among researchers as well as among citizens.
The core aim of VAAs is to facilitate decision-making processes of citizens and
enhance their participation in e-Democracy. In essence, VAAs is designed to
help voters to choose a party or a candidate during political election campaigns.
Voters are creating their political profiles, and by comparing them with profiles
of nominated candidates/parties, using di erent statistical methods, the system
recommends which candidate’s/party’s political view is the closest to the political
view of the voter. In recent years, these applications have been heavily used
during the election period in the European countries (Garzia & Marschall [2012]).
In the technical perspective, recommender techniques applied in VAAs usu-
ally use distance measure between candidate and voter profiles, or collaborative
filtering, and in some applications model-based approach. However, mentioned
techniques are limited as the data can be inferred only from the policy-issues
statements. The first attempt of VAAs extensions with social elements is pro-
posed by Katakis et al. [2014], includes a friend function, or blogs which solely
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enable interactions between users, while the generated data from these functions
remains unused. However, this data can improve the accuracy of the recom-
mendation computation. Kaskina & Radovanovic [2016] proposed a trust-aware
VAAs, which aimed to improve the recommendation accuracy by establishing
the candidates-to-voters communication via the forum channel. The candidates’
reputation scores based on their behaviour on the forum are included into the
calculation of the similarity of political profiles between voters and candidates.
In the political perspective, the core aim of VAAs is to facilitate decision-
making processes and enhance citizen’s participation in e-Democracy. However,
the impact of the VAAs on the voters’ turnout vote is still subject of discussions.
Some researchers claim the positive e ect (Garzia & Marschall [2012]), others
neutral (Fivaz & Schwarz [2007]), while some of them are more skeptical (Wal-
grave et al. [2009]). As already mentioned, VAAs’ matching between voter and
candidates is entirely based on a number of defined political statements, which
has multiple issues. A profile similarity alone may not be enough to guarantee
high-quality recommendations. Number of statements that are used to create
political profiles are limited and relevant only to the elections in question. Wal-
grave et al. [2009] show that depending on the statement configuration, VAAs
can favor certain parties/candidates in contrast to others, and very limited in
terms of taking advantage of the voter community in order to enable advanced
features like collaborative vote suggestions or interactions between voters.
A further advancement of VAAs represents a web-based application so-called
Participa Inteligente. Participa Inteligente is an academic project that arises from
the concern for citizen misinformation about policy statements and allows citi-
zens to generate spaces for discussion and participation in topics of interest to the
society (Terán & Mancera [2017]). This platform aims to enhance civic participa-
tion and empowerment by providing di erent types of recommendations (political
topics, groups, articles, and users, among others) according to the citizens’ needs.
This project expects to facilitate citizens’ decision-making by giving them more
information and resources to debate. However, the extent of citizens’ willingness
to actively participate on the platform will depend on the personal desire of dis-
closure within a political context. This platform is used as an application case
for the development of citizen privacy profile framework of the thesis.
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Citizen privacy profile framework
This section presents a citizen privacy profile (CPP) framework which is a part of
the general system architecture presented in Fig. 4.1, Sect. 4.1.2. The central part
of the framework is a citizen’s profiles provided with a privacy management tool to
preserve privacy on Participa Inteligente platform. The CPP framework displayed
in Fig. 3.2) reflects an environment where the main actor is a citizen who can
set up her profile privacy settings within the platform. The components of the
framework are designed according to the needs of the VAAs and are based on the
concepts of MyPolitics and OurPolitics as introduced by Ladner & Meier [2014].
MyPolitics is a personal political diary, where citizen may store her political
preferences, VAAs evaluations and individual opinions about elections, as well
as electronic votes. According to the citizen’s desire for disclosure, she may
partly open her political diary to individuals, family members, friends or various
communities.
On the other hand, there exists the OurPolitics option: if the citizen wants to
focus more on her individual political preferences, she can become a member of
the non-profit platform of OurPolitics. Eventually the data shared to OurPolitics
could also feed public memory. In OurPolitics, users can meet other citizens or
politicians with similar preferences and exchange ideas and information. It is
worth noting that the political context of the platform does not a ect the ba-
sic structure of the privacy management strategies, therefore, the design of the
framework was also influenced by related work in social networking sites (Aïmeur
et al. [2009]; Fang & LeFevre [2010]; Johnson et al. [2012]; Liu & E.Terzi [2010];
Stutzman et al. [2012]). Within the framework, citizens can define privacy set-
tings for their political profiles. The framework consists of five main components:
the citizen, the data levels, the audience levels, the status and the anonymity.
The citizen. The central part of the frameworks is the citizen who is using
the privacy management tool. The citizen representation includes di erent de-
mographical variables (culture, age, gender, occupation, etc.) and the citizen’s
role on the platform can be related to the voter, political candidate or political
party representative. Moreover, it is the citizen who manages the four compo-
nents of the framework, including the citizen possesses her own data, the citizen
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Figure 3.2: Citizen privacy profile framework (Meier et al. [2018])
interacts with her social network, the citizen manages the visibility of her data to
the particular level of the audience and, finally, the citizen defines the anonymity
of her shared information.
The data levels. Citizens’ privacy settings reflect their decisions on informa-
tion disclosure. In his work, Knijnenburg & Kobsa [2013] discovered that user
information disclosure is highly dependent on the information context. Indeed,
the development of social VAAsVAAs is intended to involve diversified types of
political data that contain a rich context. Therefore, four data levels are proposed,
as follows: e-Election, e-Voting, e-Posting and e-Discussion. These data levels
have been inferred from the process steps of e-Voting and e-Election described
by Meier [2012]. Each data level contains di erent types of data, as displayed in
Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Data levels and data types (Kaskina & Meier [2016])
Data level Data type
e-Election Votes for candidates, parties
e-Voting Votes for political issues, referendums
e-Posting Participation in blogs, posting on the personal wall
e-Discussion Discussion topics, questions, answers in discussion forums
However, the context of di erent data types could be perceived individually by
each person. The framework allows citizens to express their own perceptions on
data levels in terms of their degree of importance. A specific colour corresponds to
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the degree of importance which the citizen allots to the data. The most important
and valuable data is stored in the core of the component, whereas the less valuable
information is set on the outer layers (see Fig. 3.2).
The audience levels. Following the citizen’s perceptions on data types, the
citizen’s decision depends on the information disclosure to a particular group of
people (Knijnenburg & Kobsa [2013]). Therefore, the second component of the
framework belongs to the audience levels that will be derived from the social
network of the citizen. The audience levels are based on social relationships and
behavioural mechanisms used to regulate the desired levels of privacy, as presented
by Altman [1977]. As a result, audience levels have been classified as peripheral
relationship bonds represented by strangers and acquaintances, more extensive
relationship bonds such as in-laws and friends and close relationship bonds such
as family members. Similar to the data levels, each person can perceive her
audience levels di erently in terms of the relationship bonds. The extent of the
relationship bond is also indicated by both colour and layer. The family members
are in the core of the component as the closest bonds of the citizen, and strangers
and acquaintances are in the outer layers as the peripheral bonds of the citizen.
The status. Finally, the citizen, according to her privacy decision, assigns a
particular sharing status: share or hide. Assigning a share status on a particular
data type to a particular audience means that this data is open to people for
opinion exchange, feedback, discussion or interaction. The hide status means
that the citizen wishes to keep her data private and unpublished.
The anonymity. This is an optional functionality for the citizen, where they
can define their identity, whether they are sharing the data anonymously or by
identifying them self. The non-anonymous nature of the many other online plat-
forms invisibly controls users’ self-disclosure so that providing an idealized pro-
jection of the real-life “actual self” (Krasnova et al. [2009]). Including a function
of anonymous disclosure aids users for the desired freedom of self-representation.
The user decides on their identity while engaged on the political platform which
requires an additional decision-making e ort. Therefore, the anonymity func-
tionality is added as an option and is separate from the status component of
the framework. Depersonalisation or identity of oneself is a very broad privacy-
related topic which has many factors to consider. Therefore, it is accounted in the
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design of the framework but not used during the further research of this thesis.
We assume a set of n citizens C = {≠æc1 ,≠æc2 , ...,≠æci , ...,≠æcN}. According to the
CPP framework, we define a set of k = 4 audience levels given by the set of
{“Strangers”, “Acquaintances”, “Friends”, “Family”}, and a set of j = 4 data lev-
els given by the following set {“eElection”, “eVoting”, “ePosting”, “eDiscussion”}.
Each citizen ≠æci has to define a set of privacy settings S = {s11, s11, ..., skj, ..., s44}.
Thus, the privacy setting is represented as a couple of {k-th audience level; j-th
data level}. According to the CPP framework, a given citizen ≠æci has two possible
statuses share or hide. Then, each privacy setting skj can take values of 1 if
citizen ≠æci has shared the data level j to the audience level k, and 0 otherwise.
The formalisation of the anonymity of the sharing status is omitted as it is not
involved in the research of this thesis.
Table 3.2 displays an example of the privacy settings configuration. A partic-
ular citizen considers e-Election data very important to be shared with someone,
therefore, they keep this data private (hide status). However, they decide to
share e-Voting data with their family and friends, while they would like to share
e-Posting data across all their social networks. Yet, they prefer their e-Discussion
related data is kept visible only to acquaintances and strangers.
Table 3.2: Example of a citizen’s privacy settings
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhAudience levels
Data levels eElection eVoting ePosting eDiscussion
Strangers 0 0 1 1
Acquaintances 0 0 1 1
Friends 0 1 1 0
Family 0 1 1 0
There are two privacy settings’ properties: data sensitivity and data visi-
bility. The sensitivity is defined by the citizen’s decision to share a particular
data level represented as a couple of {data level, status}. The visibility cap-
tures the audience level chosen for sharing a particular data level identified as
{audience level, status}. The example above shows that e-Election data can be
perceived to be very sensitive, whereas e-Posting data is less sensitive to get the
share status. Also, the visibility of e-Posting is higher than e-Voting, whereas
e-Voting and e-Discussion have similar sensitivity but di erent visibility values.
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3.1.3 Evaluation of CPP framework
To evaluate the proposed framework and study users’ privacy attitudes towards
using VAAs, we conducted an online survey (Kaskina & Meier [2016]). The sur-
vey consisted of four multiple-choice questions, with four possible answers, where
questions were designed according to the sharing matrix as shown in Table 3.2.
Respondents were explicitly asked to express their preferences on the profile pri-
vacy settings as if they had been using the VAAs platform. The questions in
the survey were constructed according to the privacy framework components (ex-
cluding the anonymity component). Respectively, each question was seeking to
determine a person’s willingness to share a particular data level. Each multiple-
choice answer had a checkbox related to the group of people (audience level)
with whom the respondent wished to share the data. If the person left an empty
checkbox it was considered that the data level was kept private (hidden). In
total, 70 people were asked to express their privacy preferences; 57% were repre-
sentatives of Central Asia and 43% were representatives of European countries.
The respondents’ ages ranged from 22-35 years. As a result a 70-by-16 matrix
dataset was collected. Each row of the matrix represents a person, and each col-
umn represents a person’s assigned values to privacy settings. To measure the
sensitivity and visibility of the data within the proposed framework, we calcu-
lated the total number of “share” occurrences in each privacy setting’s attributes
{data level, audience level}. The results are displayed in the Fig. 3.3 and Ta-
ble 3.3.
Table 3.3: Data sensitivity and visibility (Kaskina & Meier [2016])
Sensitivity Visibility
Data Level % of “share” Audience level % of “share”
e-Discussion 47.8 % Friends 67.5 %
e-Posting 46.7 % Family 61.4 %
e-Voting 37.5 % Acquaintances 25.3 %
e-Election 36.7 % Strangers 14.6 %
First, according to Table 3.3, people clearly tend to consider, within the VAAs,
e-Voting and e-Election as the most sensitive data, whereas e-Posting and e-
Discussion are perceived as the least sensitive data. Second, it can be concluded
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Figure 3.3: Privacy settings distribution (Kaskina & Meier [2016])
that people consider friends and family as the most reliable and trustworthy
audience with whom they wish to share their political data and, thus, most of
the data is visible to friends and family. However, from the privacy settings
distribution a dependency can be noticed between users’ perceptions of the data
sensitivity and visibility. For example, Figure 3.3 illustrates that, for some, the
sensitivity of the data increases from e-Discussion to e-Election when it is visible
to strangers, acquaintances and friends, while it decreases from e-Discussion to
e-Election when it is visible to family. Moreover, the sensitivity of e-Election
and e-Voting is lowest when visible to family and friends, whereas the highest
sensitivity is observed when visible to strangers and acquaintances. The extent
of visibility (a chosen audience for sharing the data) directly depends on the
data sensitivity. However, privacy preferences might vary considerably between
di erent people; therefore, a clustering technique was applied to group people
based on their privacy preferences.
The goal of applying a clustering technique to the dataset is to classify groups
of people based on their privacy preferences. Clustering is an unsupervised learn-
ing task, where a clustering algorithm organises a given set of objects into similar
groups (clusters). Objects belonging to the same cluster are as similar as possible
to each other. Citizens will be similar with their feature vector expressing their
privacy preferences and, as a result, the groups of like-minded participants are
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identified. Since the collected dataset of survey participants represented a binary
data, the k-modes clustering algorithm is applied. The k-modes is an extension
of the k-means to deal with categorical binary data. In the k-modes we use new
dissimilarity measures to deal with categorical objects, replace means of clusters
with modes and use a frequency-based method to update modes in the cluster-
ing process to minimise the clustering cost function (Huang [1997]). According
to the number of audience levels, the initial number of clusters was set to four.
Using a built-in function of the R package klaR1, after 4 iterations the clustering
produced four groups of participants ( Fig. 3.4).
Figure 3.4: Cluster characteristics
Partitioning people into clusters allowed us to distinguish patterns of disclo-
sure preferences of the particular data types to the audience levels. In Fig. 3.4,
each table represented characteristics of each of four clusters. The coloured cells
in the tables display the vector values of the cluster prototypes produced by k-
modes clustering. The percentage numbers indicate a number of “share” statuses
on each privacy setting attribute {data level, audience level} within a cluster.
After inspecting Fig. 3.4, the following four classifications of participants can be
identified: Cluster 1 - people are willing to share all data levels with friends;
Cluster 2 - people are willing to share all data levels with family and friends,
where they also tend to share e-Posting and e-Discussion to acquaintances; Clus-
1https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/klaR/klaR.pdf
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ter 3 - people tend to share all data levels only with their family; Cluster 4 - the
smallest number of people who are willing to share all data to friends and family
only. In Cluster 3 it can be observed that while people are only family-oriented
data sharers, there are some proportion of people who also disclose e-Posting
and e-Discussion data to friends. Similar sub-tendencies of sharing e-Posting and
e-Discussion data to friends can be found in Cluster 1 and Cluster 4. However, ac-
cording to the k-modes algorithm those with similar sharing sub-tendencies were
sharply assigned to di erent clusters. This is a disadvantage of sharp clustering
when compared with fuzzy clustering techniques. In later sections the advantages
of fuzzy clustering techniques will be discussed ( Sect. 3.3.1).
3.2 Implementation of CPP
3.2.1 Platform description
This section introduces the actual implementation of the citizen privacy frame-
work (CPP) for the specified case of voting advice application (VAAs). The
Participa Inteligente (PI) web-based platform 1 is an academic project developed
and endorsed by the University of Fribourg. The main functionality of the plat-
form is to serve as a voting advice application, where citizens, according to their
political preferences, are provided with recommendations. PI generates an online
space for discussions and citizens’ participation on topics of political interest. PI
was launched in December 2016 within the campaign for the 2017 Ecuador na-
tional elections which took place in April 2017. The platform was developed in
the Drupal2 environment. The system consists of di erent platform blocks, type
of content and user roles which will be discussed in the following subsections.
The main focus of this section is the integration of the CPP framework into PI
and the implementation of privacy settings for the users’ profiles.
1https://participacioninteligente.org/
2https://www.drupal.org/
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Platform blocks
The three main platform’s blocks are the timeline, the voting advice applica-
tion and user profiles. The timeline block displays twitter feeds from presidential
candidates, vice president and the political assembly. The voting advice ap-
plication block represents a questionnaire based on political policy topics, and
further based on users’ and candidates’ profile to calculate recommendations for
the closest presidential/assembly candidates to the particular user. The user pro-
files block di erentiates between candidates/assembly and user (citizen) profiles.
Candidate profiles are created by experts, answers provided by candidates them-
selves and derived from the twitter accounts of candidates. Users’ profiles are
created by citizens.
Type of content
A various type of data content can be generated in the platform. Social Network
represent users’ social connections, such as unidirectional “follow” relations or
bidirectional “friend” relations. Static data is the users’ input which does not
change its initial value over the time, like personal information (name, date of
birth, gender, province of voting, vote intention, etc.), user’s question to the
forum. Dynamic data relates to the activity in the platform (collective number
of points gained for o ensive content/comments, invitations, published articles,
reads, etc.), explicit ratings on political topic interest (economy – 9 stars, well-
being – 5 stars, etc.), articles (user creates post of the text, video or image placed
on their wall), answers to voting advice application questionnaire or, attitudes
on published data (comments, reactions, vote up/down, negative/positive).
User roles
There are three user roles in the platform: administration, political candidate and
user (citizen). The administration role has all permissions for administering the
platform and represented by the university developers. The political candidate
role has similar permissions as the citizen role, besides that political candidate
is obliged to provide answers to the policy questions which are further filled by
experts. A user role is assigned to every registered citizen in the platform.
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3.2.2 Privacy settings functionality
It can be observed that a significant amount of diverse personal data can be
generated by users while participating on the platform. Being able to manage
privacy of one’s profile is a necessary functionality both for this platform as well
as this research. To develop a privacy management tool where users will be
able to define privacy settings for their profiles, the CPP framework proposed in
Sect. 3.1.2 is adapted for the PI platform (see Fig. 3.5). Similarly, to the CPP
framework, in the PI platform the user decides which data can be seen by other
users in the platform. By sharing particular data, a user defines to which audience
the intended data is visible or not. The audience is derived from the user’s social
network. However, while adapting to the case of the PI platform, there have been
several applied alterations to the original CPP framework, as discussed below.
Figure 3.5: CPP framework for the Participa Inteligente platform
Information – data levels
Compared to the original CPP, the colour and the layer position of the data level
in the PI platform do not indicate the increasing, or decreasing, degree of data
importance. Instead, the data layers have dashed lines which explicate that the
importance of a particular data may vary depending on each person. The data
levels and related data types in the CPP of the PI are described in Table 3.4.
There is a new added setting named “contactability”, which permits other users
of the platform to contact a particular user. Thus, the user can decide which
person from their social network can contact them via private message.
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Table 3.4: Data levels and data types
Data level Data type
Personal-
Information
Name, date of birth, gender, province of vote, level of educa-
tion, level of interest in politics
VoteIntention Users’ answer about the intended candidate to vote for
MyActivity Users’ activity on the platform – collective number of points
gained for the provided answers and comments in the forum,
number of articles read, number of posted articles, marked
supplied o ensive content, invitations
MyTopics Explicit ratings of interest in political topics – economy, edu-
cation, international politics, public politics, security, society
MyRelations The list of users’ friends and followers
Contact Me The contactability of profile – who can contact the user on
the platform via private message
Figure 3.6: Privacy settings (visibility)
Figure 3.7: Audience selection
Fig. 3.6 shows the implementation of the privacy settings for the five data
levels – PersonalInformation, VoteIntention, MyActivity, MyTopics and MyRela-
tions. By clicking on the checkbox, the user shares a particular data level to the
public space of the platform. If the checkbox is left unticked, then the data level
stays private and only visible to the owner of the user profile. It is important to
note that by selecting the data level for disclosure, all related data types within
this data level will be visible. In other words, the privacy setting is applied to the
whole set of the data level and not for a particular data type. In the PI platform,
the CPP framework has only one status for the disclosure – “share (publish)”
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(see Fig. 3.5). It does not contain a “hide” status as CPP has an altered social
network structure which does not require applying the status “hide”. Particularly,
the “hide” was substituted with the “ShareToMe” status. As the anonymity is
not considered in this research, the anonymity component was also eliminated
from the framework. Thus, the function in Fig. 3.6 implements an actual privacy
setting, whereas the module of audience selection depicted in Fig. 3.7 requests
users express their opinions to specific parts of their social network (audience lev-
els) where a particular data level can be visible. This module does not a ect the
actual configuration of the profile visibility, it solely collects users sharing opin-
ions of the data levels among their audience levels. The actual e ect of privacy
settings is performed by the module displayed in Fig. 3.6
Social network – audience levels
Conversely from the CPP framework ( Sect. 3.1.2), the social network structure
has the following audience levels: 1 – only me, i.e. sharing to the family in real-
case applications is not a common functionality, for the PI the audience level of
the “family” was substituted with “only me”; 2 – friends, 3 – friends of friends,
and 4 - visible to public space ( Fig. 3.5). An indispensable part of the user’s
privacy decision relies on the audience, whether the data is visible to particular
audience or not. To build up a social network two types of relations are defined
within PI platform: friend and follower relations ( Fig. 3.8, Fig. 3.9). Having
friends relations, the graph of the user’s social network can be built and the
friends of friends relations can be calculated.
Figure 3.8: Add a friend/follower
Figure 3.9: A list of user’s relations
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3.2.3 Privacy profiles extraction
Unlike the preliminary research presented in Sect. 3.1.2, where data was collected
from a survey, this dataset consists of expressed user privacy preferences towards
sharing their political data levels to a particular part of their social network
while engaged in the registration process on the PI platform. The dataset was
collected during the 3-months period of December 2016 - February 2017. In
this study we investigated information disclosure behaviour of users, precisely, to
which audience they prefer to share the data levels of the profile. In the platform,
the users’ privacy settings are stored in a MySQL database.
It worth noting that for users who did not set up their preferences in Fig. 3.7,
the default privacy settings were set up to public visibility. For our investigation
we had extracted users’ privacy settings from the MySQL database on which the
PI operates. The dataset represents a set of user vectors with six dimensions
related to the data levels - {MyActivity, ContactMe, MyRelations, MyTopics,
PersonalInformation and VoteIntention}. Each data level can take four values
by assigning a sharing status to a particular audience level in sets {1 means
“OnlyMe”, 2 – Friends, 3 – FriendsOfFriends, 4 –Public} as seen in Table 3.5.
Following dataset cleaning and analysis preparation, the final data consisted of
391 user privacy profiles. This consisted of 131 females, 253 males, and 7 users
who did not provide gender information. The age of users is between 23 and 36
(median age is 28).
Table 3.5: Dataset description
User Variables (data types)MyActivity ContactMe MyRelations MyTopics PersInf VoteIntention
U1 2 3 2 3 3 2
U2 1 3 1 1 1 1
U3 4 3 3 2 1 1
U4 1 2 2 2 2 2
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
U391 4 4 4 2 2 1
The explorative analysis unveils preliminary tendencies in the dataset. Ac-
cording to Table 3.5 there are six variables (dimensions) in the dataset. The
correlations analysis displayed in Table 3.6 enables an investigation into whether
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those variables are independent, or if they are interdependent and correlated.
Table 3.6: Data levels correlations.
MyActivity ContactMe MyRelations MyTopics PersonalInfo
MyActivity
ContactMe 0.40****
MyRelations 0.72**** 0.39****
MyTopics 0.64**** 0.43**** 0.56****
PersonalInfo 0.56**** 0.34**** 0.64**** 0.52****
VoteIntention 0.58**** 0.34**** 0.58**** 0.60**** 0.59****
(1) p < .0001 ****; p < .001 ***; p < .01 **; p < .05 *
Table 3.6 indicates that the highest correlation is between the MyActivity and
MyRelations data, indicating that they are dependent and have similar sharing
tendencies. It is also interesting to note that the MyActivity data is strongly cor-
related with the MyTopics data, while the disclosure decisions on political topics
(MyTopics) are in turn correlated with disclosure decision on VoteIntention. The
visibility preferences of PersonalInfo strongly correlates with the MyRelations
data. Noticeably, a higher variance is observed with the ContactMe dimension.
This can be justified with the fact that this variable does not perceptually relate
as a data level as it was designed as the functionality to allow other users to
contact oneself. In contrast, other variables directly represent the disclosure of
the data, therefore the ContactMe variable scored the lowest correlations among
those variables.
In general, the dataset showed that there were only positive correlations.
There exist tendencies in disclosing political information, such as if the MyActiv-
ity data is open to the public then MyRelation is also open to the public. However,
correlation among variables indicates dependencies among them, as well as the
lack of independent variables. Potentially the political context of the platform
a ects di erent data types that are well correlated, such as the disclosure be-
haviour of VoteIntention depends on what decisions were taken when disclosing
political topics of the user. However, the correlation analysis is not su cient to
make final conclusions on the dataset. For example, there are correlations with
low p-values, between ContactMe and VoteIntention, and between PersonalInfor-
mation and MyTopics. Thus, there is a chance of existence of multidimensional
privacy profiles which the following section discusses in detail.
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3.3 User privacy profiles modeling
This thesis applies di erent fuzzy clustering algorithms on the dataset of users’
privacy profiles. This section illustrates how a user with the multidimensional
privacy profile can belong to several clusters to some certain degree of belonging.
Knowing this additional information can reduce an oversimplification problem on
estimating user’s privacy behaviour and improve the model accuracy. We explore
di erent fuzzy clustering algorithms parametrized with di erent distance metrics.
3.3.1 Fuzzy clustering
Dataset clustering tendency
As clustering is an unsupervised machine learning, and in our case the existing
number of clusters in unknown, we will analyse the dataset’s tendency to be
clustered into groups. Also, analysing the feasibility of the clustering analysis
helps avoid meaningless clustering. The method of a visual assessment of cluster
tendency (VAT) was applied using the R package “fclust”1 originally described
by Bezdek & Hathaway [2002]. This approach can be used to visually inspect
the clustering tendency of the dataset. It computes the dissimilarity matrix be-
tween the objects in the dataset using a Euclidean distance measure, then reorder
the dissimilarity matrix so that similar objects are close to one another. Darkly
shaded diagonal blocks correspond to assumed clusters in the data. Therefore,
k dark blocks along the main diagonal suggest that the data contain k assumed
clusters. The size of each block represents the approximate size of the clus-
ter (Giordani & Ferraro [2015]). The visual clustering assessment indicated the
existence of four explicitly dark blocks (clusters), where there is a block in the
left-side top that appears to contain several sub-blocks. From this figure, a poten-
tial fuzziness of user privacy profile can already be observed, which is represented
by possible existence of those small subclusters.
This thesis focuses on the application of fuzzy clustering techniques as they
better deal with overlapped cluster structures. To demonstrate the advantage of
fuzzy clustering, Fig. 3.11 displays the plot with classic k-means clustering (R
1https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/fclust/fclust.pdf
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Figure 3.10: Visual assessment of cluster tendency
function kmeans()), whereas Fig. 3.12 plots the partition produced by the fuzzy
c-means clustering algorithm (R package “e1071” function cmeans()). Both use
the Euclidean distance with four clusters. When considering the selected regions
of data points on both plots, it can be seen that sharp k-means clustering hardly
distinguishes the overlapped cluster-2 and cluster-3 and produces a mixed distri-
bution of its points, whereas fuzzy clustering could perform a better identification
of the overlapped clusters structure. Now, unlike to the k-means results, users
375, 69, 234 and 215 belong to the same cluster. Also, all four clusters are better
separated when compared to the k-means cluster separation. In this research a
fuzzy clustering algorithms are chosen against sharp clustering.
Table 3.7 outlines the characteristics of the fuzzy clustering algorithms used
for this research, particularly, what type of cluster, shape the algorithm is ca-
pable to detect, including the required input parameters to run the clustering
technique. The detailed algorithms of both techniques are described in the sub-
sequent sections.
Table 3.7: Overview of the used fuzzy clustering algorithms
Algorithm structure
Clusters Shape Input Parameters
crisp fuzzy sphere ellipse m fuzzifier stop criteria iter. dist. n of clust.
FCM x x x x x x x
PAM x x x x x x x
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Figure 3.11: K-means clustering with Euclidean norm of four cluster partitions
Figure 3.12: FCM clustering with Euclidean norm of four cluster partitions
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Fuzzy C-means clustering
The main objective of the Fuzzy C-means (FCM) algorithm is to compute the
similarity between an object shared with each cluster using a membership func-
tion. The membership function calculates the membership degree of each object
in every cluster with values in the range of [0,1]. A high degree of similarity
between the object and a cluster is assigned when a membership value is close to
1, whereas values close to 0 imply a low similarity between the object and that
cluster (Bezdek et al. [1984]). Initially proposed by Dunn [1973], this algorithm
was later improved by Bezdek who introduced the idea of a fuzzification param-
eter m in the range [1, N ], which determines the degree of fuzziness in clusters.
When m = 1 the e ect is a crisp clustering of points, when m > 1 the degree of
fuzziness among points increases.
With FCM clustering it is possible to obtain a hard c-partitions, while with
hard clustering it is impossible to determine fuzzy c-partitions. Therefore, the
advantage of FCM clustering is that an observation can belong entirely to one
cluster and, at the same time, have a partial membership in several fuzzy clus-
ters. In addition, FCM clustering helps in dealing with undistinctive data. FCM
attempts to find the most characteristic point in each cluster, which can be con-
sidered as the “centroid” of the cluster and, then, the membership degree for each
object in the clusters. This goal is achieved by minimising the objective function,
which is defined as follows (Wang & Zhang [2007]):
MinimiseJm(U, V ) =
Nÿ
i=1
Cÿ
j=1
umij ||xi ≠ cj||2 (3.1)
where N is the number of data points in a given dataset, C is the number of clus-
ters required; X = {x1, x2, ..., xN} µ RS is the feature data; V = {c1, c2, ..., cC} µ
RS are cluster centroids; and U = [uij]C◊N is a fuzzy partition matrix composed
of the membership degrees of the i-th data point xi in cluster j. The norm, ||xi -
cj|| measures the similarity (or closeness) of the data point xi to the centre vector
cj of cluster j. According to Bezdek et al. [1984] di erent norms can be used, such
as Euclidean, diagonal or Mahalanobis. In each iteration the algorithm maintains
a centre vector for each of the clusters. These cluster centres are calculated as the
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weighted average of the population, where the weights are given by the degrees
of membership stored in the membership matrix. The cluster centre vector cj is
calculated according to the formula Eq. (3.2):
cj =
qN
i=1 u
m
ij · xiqN
i=1 u
m
ij
(3.2)
where uij is the value of the degree of membership calculated in the previous
iteration. The membership matrix contains the membership degree of each ob-
servation to a cluster and is calculated according to the formula Eq. (3.3):
uij =
1qC
k=1(
||xi≠cj ||
||xi≠ck||)
2
m≠1
(3.3)
where ||xi - cj|| – is the distance from the observation i to current cluster centre
j, ||xi - ck|| – is the distance from the observation i to other cluster centres k, m
– the fuzziness coe cient.
At the start of the algorithm, the degree of membership of the observation to
cluster k is initialised with a random value. In equations Eq. (3.1), Eq. (3.3)
the fuzziness coe cient m, where 1 < m < Œ, measures the tolerance of the
required clustering. This value determines how much the clusters can overlap
with one another. The higher the value of m, the larger the overlap between
clusters. The required accuracy of the degree of membership determines the
number of iterations completed by the FCM algorithm. This measure of accuracy
is calculated using the degree of membership from one iteration to the next, taking
the largest of these values across all data points whilst considering all of the
clusters. If we represent the measure of accuracy between iteration k and k + 1,
then iterations will stop at the convergence condition maxij{|ui(k+1)j ≠uij(k)|} < ‘,
where ‘ is a termination criterion between 0 and 1, whereas k is the iteration steps.
This procedure converges to a local minimum.
The FCM algorithm is a perfect solution when the initial number of clusters is
known, if not, then determining the optimal number of cluster for a dataset is an
important requirement. Defining an optimal number of clusters is referred to the
term of a cluster validity and will be discussed in Sect. 3.3.2. The calculation of
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FCM algorithm is performed with R package “e1071”1, function cmeans(). The
function cmeans() randomly selects cluster centroids values with the weighting
exponent m=2 used as the best recommended value for calculations of fuzzy
clustering (Pal & Bezdek [1995]).
Partitioning Around Medoids clustering
When partitioning a set of objects into k clusters, the initial objective is to find
clusters in each with the objects represented by a high degree of similarity, while
objects belonging to di erent clusters are as dissimilar as possible. The algorithm
of the Partitioning Around Medoids (PAM), proposed by Kaufman & Rousseeuw
[2009], searches for the k representative objects, named medoids among objects
in the given dataset. In contrast to traditional FCM algorithm, where centroids
are calculated as artificial object means, these medoids are computed such that
the total dissimilarity of all objects to their nearest medoid is minimal.
The algorithm of PAM consists of two phases: build and swap. In the build
phase, an initial clustering is obtained by the successive selection of representative
objects until k objects have been found. The first object is the one for which the
sum of the dissimilarities to all other objects is as small as possible. This object
is the most centrally located within the set of objects. Subsequently, at each step
another object is selected. This object is the one which decreases the objective
function as much as possible. To find this object, the following steps are carried
out:
1. Consider the object i which has not yet been selected.
2. Consider a non-selected object j and calculate the di erence between its
dissimilarity Dj with the most similar previously selected object, and its
dissimilarity d(j, i) with object i.
3. If this di erence is positive, object j will contribute to the decision to select
object i. Therefore, the following is calculated:
Cji = max(Dj ≠ d(j, i), 0) (3.4)
1https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/e1071/index.html
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4. Calculate the total gain obtained by selecting object i:
ÿ
j
Cji (3.5)
5. Choose the not yet selected object i which
maximisesi
ÿ
j
Cji (3.6)
This process is continued until k objects have been found. The second phase
swap of the PAM algorithm attempts to improve the set of representative objects
and the clustering derived by this set. This is achieved by considering all pairs
of objects (i, h) for which object i has been selected and object h is not. It is
determined what e ect is obtained on the values of the clustering when a swap is
carried out, as when object i is no longer selected as a representative object but
object h is.
To calculate the e ect of a swap between i and h on the clustering, the fol-
lowing calculations are carried out:
1. Consider a non-selected object j and calculate its contribution Cjih to the
swap:
(a) If j is further from both i and h than from one of the other represen-
tative objects, Cjih is zero.
(b) If j is not further from i than from any other selected representative
object (d(j, i) = Dj), two situations must be considered: (i) j is closer
to h than to the second closest representative object d(j, h) < Ej,
where Ej is the dissimilarity between j and the second most similar
representative object. In this case the contribution of object j to the
swap between objects i and h is Cjih = d(j, h) ≠ d(j, i); (ii) j is at
least as distant from h from the second closest representative object
d(j, h) Ø Ej. In this case the contribution of object j to the swap is
Cjih = Ej ≠ Dj. It should be observed that in the situation (i) the
contribution Cjih can either be positive or negative depending on the
relative position of objects j, h, and i. Only if object j is closer to i
than to h is the contribution positive, which indicates that the swap is
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not favourable from the point of view of object j. On the other hand,
in situation (ii) the contribution is always positive because it cannot
be advantageous to replace i by an object h further away from j than
from the second closest representative object.
(c) j is more distant from object i than from at least one of the other rep-
resentative objects, but closer to h than to any representative object.
In this case the contribution of j to the swap is Cjih = d(j, h)≠Dj.
2. Calculate the total result of a swap by adding the contributions Cjih: Tih =q
j Cjih. In the next steps it is decided whether or not to carry out a swap.
3. Select the pair (i, h) which minimisesTih. If the minimum Tih is negative,
the swap is carried out and the algorithm returns to step 1. If the mini-
mum Tih is positive or 0, the value of the objective cannot be decreased by
carrying out a swap and, as such, the algorithm stops.
The objective function of PAM algorithm solely depends on the dissimilarity
between objects, therefore, the algorithm can be parametrised with di erent dis-
tance metrics. The fuzzy membership degrees for each object are calculated as
a probability (in a range [0,1]) of the belonging based on the distance between
observations and medoids. The benefit of this algorithm is that it looks through
a real-case privacy profiles and chooses the cluster centres (medoids) from a true
existing privacy profile of the population. Moreover, it does not require initial
guesses for the cluster centroids, unlike in FCM algorithm. This point is advan-
tageous, especially for the case of this research, when there is no prior knowledge
about cluster centres in the dataset. PAM algorithm is more robust than FCM
in the presence of noise and outliers as a medoid is less influenced by outliers or
other extreme values than a mean. However, the processing is not as cost e ec-
tive (Rokach & Maimon [2005]). The calculation of PAM algorithm is performed
with R package “ClusterR”1, function cluster_medoids().
Measuring distances
An important issue in clustering is to decide how the similarity between data
points should be defined in order to form clusters where the data points have a
1https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/ClusterR/ClusterR.pdf
49
Citizen Privacy Profile Framework
high similarity to each other and a low similarity to data points from other clus-
ters. The proximity between two data points identifies its closeness which can be
expressed in terms of similarity, dissimilarity or distance between two data points.
Thus, two data points are close when their dissimilarity or distance is small, or
their similarity is large. The formal dissimilarity on the set S can be defined as
a function d from S ◊ S to the real numbers as following (Portmann [2012]): (i)
d(x, y) Ø 0 for all x, y belonging to S; (ii) d(x, y) = 0 if, and only if, x = y;
(iii) d(x, y) = d(x, y) for all x, y belonging to S. Both aforementioned clustering
Table 3.8: Overview of distance metrics
Name Formula FCM PAM
Euclidean d =
Òqn
i=1(xi ≠ yi)2(3.7) x x
Manhattan d = qni=1 |xi ≠ yi|(3.8) x x
Mahalanobis d(x˛, y˛) =
Ò
(x˛≠ y˛)TS≠1(x˛≠ y˛)(3.9) x
methods use the distance metric to calculate the similarity between objects. For
the clustering implementation two common distances are used: Euclidean and
Manhattan. Also, PAM clustering with Mahalanobis distance is calculated as
this distance is entirely di erent from others and deals with the covariance ma-
trix. Euclidean distance takes the square root of the sum of the squares of the
di erences between two points, while Manhattan distance computes the distance
that would be travelled to get from one data point to the other if a grid-like path
is followed. The Manhattan distance between two items is the sum of the dif-
ferences of their corresponding components. The Mahalanobis distance accounts
for the fact that the variances in each direction are di erent and considers the
covariance between variables. It reduces to the familiar Euclidean distance for
uncorrelated variables with unit variance.
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3.3.2 Evaluation of clustering validity
Clustering of the dataset is an unsupervised technique and when the initial num-
ber of clusters in the dataset is unknown, then the critical question becomes in
defining the right number of potential partitions in the dataset. The issue when
finding an optimal c is usually called cluster validity (Wang & Zhang [2007]).
To validate whether the clustering technique performed an accurate partition-
ing of the dataset, the validity function can evaluate the clustering result. In
the literature many validity indexes have been proposed for the validation of the
dataset partition produced by fuzzy clustering algorithms. Validity indexes are
considered to be independent of clustering algorithms (Wu & Yang [2005]).
Most validity indexes search through all c clusters to measure the degree
of compactness and separation of an optimal c, so that each of these optimal
c clusters is compact and separated from other clusters (Wu & Yang [2005]).
The compactness measures the closeness of cluster elements, i.e. their variance,
where the low variance is an indicator of closeness. The separation indicates
how distinct two clusters are and computes the “distance” between two di erent
clusters. Thus, the aim of validation indexes has been to locate the clustering
that minimises the compactness and maximises the separation (Kim et al. [2004]).
Table 4.1 outlines the validity indexes used in this research. As shown, the validity
indexes di er on the parameters used for the calculation, and on its inherent
properties of detecting the compactness and separation of data partitions, as well
as the criteria for choosing the optimal number of clusters.
Table 3.9: Overview of validation indexes
Name Criteria Parameters used Property
U = [uij] 1 V 2 X3 Compact Separation
Partition Coe cient max(PC) x x
Partition Entropy min(PE) x x
Modified Partition Coe cient max(MPC) x x
Xie and Beni min(XBI) x x x x x
Crisp Silhouette max(CS) x x x
Fuzzy Silhouette max(FS) x x x x x
(1) Fuzzy partition matrix (membership degrees)
(2) Set of cluster centroids derived from the clustering result
(3) Initial dataset
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Partition coe cient (PC)
In his work, Bezdek [1974] defined a performance measure based on minimising
the overall content of a pairwise fuzzy intersection in U , the partition matrix
and, thus, proposed the partition coe cient. The PC index indicates the average
relative amount of membership sharing between pairs of fuzzy subsets in U , by
combining them into a single number and average the contents of pairs of fuzzy
algebraic products Wang & Zhang [2007]. The PC index was defined as:
VPC =
1
n
cÿ
i=1
nÿ
j=1
u2ij (3.10)
where 1c 6 VPC 6 1. The optimal cluster number cú is found through solving
max26c6n≠1VPC to produce the best clustering performance for the data set X.
Partition entropy (PE)
Another measure of cluster validity using membership matrix as introduced by
Bezdek [1974] is a partition entropy. The PE index is a scalar measure of the
amount of fuzziness in a given U , Wang & Zhang [2007] defined as:
VPE =
1
n
cÿ
i=1
nÿ
j=1
u2ijlogau
2
ij (3.11)
where a is the base of the logarithm, 0 6 VPE 6 logac. The optimal cluster
number cú is found by solving min26c6n≠1VPE to produce the best clustering
performance for the data set X.
Modified partition coe cient (MPC)
To reduce the monotonic evolution tendency with c of PC and PE indexes, Dave
[1996] proposed the modification of the VPC index. The modified partition coef-
ficient is defined as:
VMPC = 1≠≠ c
c≠ 1(1≠≠VPC) (3.12)
where 0 6 VMPC 6 1. The optimal cluster number cú is found by solving
max26c6n≠1VMPC to produce the best clustering performance for the data set X.
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Jiu-Lun Fan & Ma [2000] show that MPC performance to be simpler and more
e ective. Yet, PC, MPC and PE have received criticism as they use only fuzzy
membership values and do not consider geometrical and topological properties
of the dataset. Wang & Zhang [2007] enumerates following drawbacks of these:
the monotonous dependency on the number of clusters; the sensitivity to the
fuzzifier m; the lack of direct connection to the geometry of the data, as they
do not use the data itself. Bezdek [1974] remarked that if the algorithm is not
finding a significant cluster substructure in X, it may be the fault of either the
algorithm or the data lacking structure. Consequently, the unique minimum VPC
(or maximum VPE) are very helpful in deciding when the structure is not being
found. In contrast, the following indexes measure both fuzzy memberships and
the data structure.
Xie and Beni index (XBI)
According to Pal & Bezdek [1995], the proposed validity index by Xie & Beni
[1991] is the most reliable and proved to have the best response over a wide range
of choices for both the number of clusters and the weighting exponent. Modified
by Pal & Bezdek [1995], XBI is identified as:
VXBI =
Jm(u, c)/n
Sep(c) =
qc
i=1
qn
j=1 u
m
ij ||xi ≠ cj||2
n mini,j||ci ≠ cj||2 (3.13)
The XBI index measures both the compactness and the separation of clusters.
The VXBI equation’s numerator indicates the compactness of the fuzzy partition,
while the denominator indicates the strength of the separation between clusters.
A good partition produces a small value for the compactness, and that well-
separated cj will produce a high value for the separation. Thus, an optimal cú is
found by solving min26c6n≠1VXBI to produce the best clustering performance for
the data set X.
Crisp silhouette (CS)
Another more commonly used measure is the Crisp Silhouette (CS). According
to Campello & Hruschka [2006] to define this criterion first you need to consider
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a data object j œ {1, 2, ..., N} belonging to cluster c œ {1, ..., C}. In the context
of crisp partitions produced by a prototype-based clustering algorithm (e.g. k-
means), this means that the object j is closer to the prototype of cluster c than
to any other prototype. Then in the context of fuzzy partitions, on the other
hand, this means that the membership of the jth object to the pth fuzzy cluster,
ucj, is higher than the membership of this object to any other fuzzy cluster, i.e.
ucj > uqj for every q œ {1, ..., c}, q ”= c (Campello & Hruschka [2006]). The
silhouette of object j is defined as:
sj =
bcj ≠ acj
max{acj, bcj} (3.14)
where, acj is an average distance (based on the same norm adopted in the
fuzzy clustering algorithm) of object j to all other objects belonging to cluster
p; dqj is the average distance of this object to all objects belonging to another
cluster q, q ”= p; bcj is the minimum dqj computed over q = 1, ..., c, q ”= c, which
represents the dissimilarity of object j to its closest neighbouring cluster. The
denominator of Eq. (3.14) is used solely as a normalisation term. Thus, the
higher value of sj indicates the good assignment of object j to cluster c. In case
c is a cluster constituted uniquely by object j, then the silhouette of this object
is defined as sj = 0. To prevent such cases the Crisp Silhouette was defined as
the average of sj over j = 1, 2, ..., N , i.e.:
VCS =
1
N
Nÿ
j=1
sj (3.15)
to establish the trivial solution c = N , with each object of the data set
forming a cluster on its own. Thus, the optimal number of cluster is found when
CS is maximised, which implies minimising the intra-cluster distance (apj) while
maximising the inter-cluster distance (bpj) (Campello & Hruschka [2006]).
Fuzzy silhouette (FS)
The CS index neglects discrimination of overlapped data clusters as it does
not explicitly consider the fuzzy partition matrix. The fuzzy partition matrix
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U = [uij]C◊N is only used to apply on the data set a crisp partition U = [uij]C◊N ,
in particular U is such that uij = 1 if i = argmaxl{ulj} and uij = 0 otherwise.
Thus, the CS index neglects discrimination of overlapped data clusters – even if
these clusters have their own regions with higher data densities – as it does not ex-
plicitly consider the fuzzy partition matrix U on degrees to which clusters overlap
(Campello & Hruschka [2006]). To that, a generalised silhouette criterion named
the Fuzzy Silhouette (FS) index have been developed by Campello & Hruschka
[2006] and considers the fuzzy partition matrix of each observation to detect areas
with higher data densities when the dataset potentially has overlapping clusters.
It is defined as:
VFS =
qN
j=1(ucj ≠ uqj)–sjqN
j=1(ucj ≠ uqj)–
(3.16)
where sj is the silhouette of the object j according to Eq. (3.14); ucj and
uqj are the first and second largest elements of the jth column of the fuzzy par-
tition matrix; and – > 0 is a weighting coe cient. Campello & Hruschka [2006]
remarks that Eq. (3.16) di ers from Eq. (3.15) for being a weighted average
of the individual silhouettes given by Eq. (3.14). As Campello & Hruschka
[2006] explain, “the weight of each term is determined by the di erence between
the membership degrees of the corresponding object to its first and second best
matching fuzzy clusters, respectively. This way, an object in the near region of
a cluster prototype is given more importance than another object located in an
overlapping area.”
Analysis of the validation results
Table 3.10 outlines the steps of the validation procedure used to determine the
optimal partition and optimal number of clusters. The input dataset has n = 391
observations and p = 6 dimensions (see Table 3.5). The validation procedure
applies Fuzzy C-means (FCM) with Euclidean and Manhattan distances, and
fuzzy Partitioning Around Medoids (PAM) with additional Mahalanobis distance.
The validation indexes were calculated using the R package “fclust”1. The
1https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/fclust/index.html
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Table 3.10: FCM and PAM validation procedure
Step
Step 1: Initialise the parameters of the algorithm, except for the number of
clusters, c.
Step 2: Run the algorithms for di erent values of c’s over the range c =
2, 3, ..., cmax, where cmax = 15
Step 3: Compute the validity index for each partition (U, V ) obtained from
step 2.
Step 4: Choose the optimal partition and the optimal c according to the
criteria.
Table 3.11: Cluster validation of FCM clustering algorithms
Index FCM with Euclidean norm
1, m = 2, ‘ = 0.001, T = 100, V0 = c randomly chosen2
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
VPC 0.77 0.64 0.57 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.60
VPE 0.36 0.61 0.80 0.91 0.99 1.07 1.04 1.09 1.09 1.06 1.08 1.16 1.19 1.12
VMPC 0.54 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.57
VCS 0.62 0.52 0.44 0.46 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.56 0.56 NaN NaN 0.55
VFS 0.73 0.74 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.79 0.80 NaN NaN 0.80
VXBI 0.16 0.30 0.77 1.56 0.40 0.48 0.80 10.54 122.06 0.19 5.81 * ** 641
Index FCM with Manhattan norm
1, m = 2, ‘ = 0.001, T = 100, V0 = c randomly chosen2
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
VPC 0.73 0.64 0.58 0.56 0.59 0.57 0.27 0.25 0.50 0.17 0.52 0.52 0.48 0.45
VPE 0.40 0.61 0.78 0.89 0.88 0.96 1.64 1.77 1.24 2.06 1.28 1.29 1.44 1.54
VMPC 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.50 0.49 0.17 0.15 0.45 0.09 0.47 0.49 0.44 0.42
VCS 0.60 0.43 0.41 0.43 0.46 0.47 NaN NaN 0.46 NaN 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.44
VFS 0.75 0.65 0.64 0.69 0.71 0.74 NaN NaN 0.77 NaN 0.73 0.69 0.65 0.79
VXB 0.13 0.15 0.25 0.32 0.27 0.22 Inf Inf 0.14 Inf 0.55 0.12 0.25 0.45
(1) Algorithm run with cmeans() function of package “e1071”
(2) c is number of clusters displayed in columns
(3) * 57747.10
(4) ** 32277.93
results of the FCM validation procedure are displayed in Table 3.11, and PAM in
Table 3.12. There are no explicit guidelines on choosing optimal number of clus-
ters based on indexes values. As it can be seen from Table 3.11 and Table 3.12, not
all indexes agree on the same number of clusters, therefore, the value of optimal
number of clusters was selected on the agreed majority of indexes. Highlighted
in bold is the optimal value of c selected by each index according to its criteria
mentioned in Table 3.9.
For FCM with Euclidean distance, PC, MPC, CS, PE indexes agree on c
= 2 clusters, while FS and MPC suggest c = 15 clusters. The results of PC,
PE and CS of FCM with Manhattan distance show c = 2 clusters is the best
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Table 3.12: Cluster validation of PAM clustering algorithms
Index PAM with Euclidean norm
1, cmax = 15
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
VPC 0.70 0.60 0.55 0.58 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.60
VPE 0.43 0.66 0.83 0.85 0.94 0.99 1.04 1.08 1.11 1.06 1.09 1.10 1.12 1.14
VMPC 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.57
VCS 0.60 0.42 0.45 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.50 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58
VFS 0.77 0.75 0.77 0.71 0.72 0.75 0.72 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.83
VXBI 0.18 0.42 0.29 0.35 0.27 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.12
Index PAM with Manhattan norm
1, cmax = 15
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
VPC 0.73 0.64 0.60 0.57 0.59 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.61
VPE 0.40 0.60 0.74 0.86 0.88 0.96 0.97 0.98 1.00 1.03 1.05 1.05 1.08 1.10
VMPC 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.58
VCS 0.62 0.41 0.43 0.47 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.56
VFS 0.74 0.60 0.63 0.70 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.76
VXBI 0.13 0.50 0.19 0.15 0.26 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.11
Index PAM with Mahalanobis norm
1, cmax = 15
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
VPC 0.66 0.59 0.56 0.53 0.51 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58
VPE 0.47 0.68 0.81 0.94 1.04 1.00 1.04 1.08 1.09 1.12 1.15 1.18 1.20 1.22
VMPC 0.33 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.55
VCS 0.59 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.53
VFS 0.82 0.70 0.68 0.73 0.75 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.79
VXBI 0.23 0.68 0.23 0.20 0.16 0.26 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.10
(1) Algorithm run with Cluster_Medoids() function of package “ClusterR”
Table 3.13: Results of cluster validity indexes for optimal N of clusters
hhhhhhhhhhhhAlgorithm
Distance Euclidean Manhattan Mahalanobis
FCM 2, 15, 4, 5, 7 2, 6, 13, 15 x
PAM 2, 15, 4 2, 15, 3, 5, 6 2, 15, 6
cluster number estimate. However, MPC calculated c = 6 clusters, XBI – 13, FS
– 15. In addition, indexes CS and FS produced not a number (NaN) values for
FCM Euclidean with c = 13 and 14, and FCM Manhattan with c = 8, 9 and 11
clusters. After the inspection of the clustering results with these number of cluster
centroids, it was discovered that the FCM algorithm with both distances produces
cluster centroids with equal values. In other words, it detects two centroids at the
same data point, which indicates an undistinguishable structure of the dataset.
As cluster centroids values are a major parameter for CS and FS calculations,
these indexes fail to perform with equal centroids coordinates. Similarly, the XBI
index did not perform validation on these number of clusters producing infinity
57
Citizen Privacy Profile Framework
(Inf) value. This behaviour demonstrates the incapability of FCM algorithm to
find valid partitions (separate & compact) with these number of c clusters. In
contrast, PAM clustering has succeeded at detecting the structure in the data
by producing valid values of indexes. This could be due to the fact that PAM
considers initial cluster centroids from the given dataset and not calculated as
artificial objects (weighted means) as is the case with FCM. According to the
agreement of PC, PE, CS and FS, the optimal of c = 2 is found for PAM with
Euclidean, Manhattan and Mahalanobis distances, however, MPC, FS and XBI
also indicated the best partition with c = 15.
Figure 3.13: FCM Euclidean c = 2
To visualise the suggested partitions, the plots presented in this section are
produced with the help of fviz_cluster() function of the R package factoextra1.
The visualisation is based on two dimensions, where the fviz_cluster() function
1https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/factoextra/factoextra.pdf
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Figure 3.14: PAM Mahalanobis c = 15
conducts principle component analysis (Smith [2002]) of the given dataset, and
plots its first two principle components on x and y axes of the plot. Fig. 3.13
illustrates the partition dataset of the FCM Euclidean with c = 2 as per the
suggested valid values of indexes. As observed, a 2-cluster solution can potentially
provide a good separation of clusters, however, the compactness is drastically low.
Fig. 3.14 displays a 15-cluster solution as produced by the PAM Mahalanobis
algorithm. It can be observed that the compactness of clusters is partially im-
proved, whereas the separation of cluster centroids significantly su ers. For exam-
ple, clusters 1, 6, 8 and 14 are small and compact, however, they hardly separate
with other neighbouring clusters whereas cluster 11 is distinctively separated but
its data points are weakly compacted. It is interesting to note that while the
FCM algorithm tends to produce only spherical clusters, while PAM produces
spherical clusters like 3 and 10, as well as more ellipsoidal clusters like 8 and 11.
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In general, the proposed optimal number of clusters unfortunately does not
retain both properties of compactness and separation of produced partition. This
could be due to the following reasons; one is the nature of the given dataset and
the lack of its structure. It seems that privacy profiles tend to be indistinctive, and
dataset dimensions are highly correlated among each other (see Table 3.6). To
that, Pal & Bezdek [1995] suggest that “the unique minimum VPC (or maximum
VPE) are very helpful in deciding when the structure is not being found.” In our
dataset, the proposed validity indexes values of c = 2 or 15 clusters do not provide
useful information, which indicates a vague structure and hardly distinguishable
observations in the dataset. Therefore, the min(PC), min(MPC) and max(PE)
values are observed. As a result, the max(PE) values always tend to the maximum
number of clusters which does not support obtaining meaningful classifications.
The min(PC) indicated for FCM Euclidean c = 7, FCM Manhattan c = 11,
PAM Euclidean c = 4, PAM Manhattan c = 5 and 7, PAM Mahalanobis c =
6 (indicated in bold in Table 3.13). According to that, Fig. 3.15 and Fig. 3.16
display visualisations of FCM Euclidean with 7 clusters and PAM Mahalanobis
with 6 clusters as the most di erentiated partition representation among other
suggestions as produced by a min(PC). It can be seen that, when compared to
a 2-cluster solution, the FCM Euclidean with 7 clusters produced more compact
clusters like 3, 4, 6, however, there are still clusters with low compactness but
higher separation, for instance clusters 1, 5 and 7. PAM Mahalanobis with 6
clusters partitioned more compact ellipsoidal clusters as 2, 3, 4, 6, where cluster
3 is the most separate one. Clusters 1 and 5 have the spherical form with low
compactness and separation from other clusters. It can be concluded that with the
given dataset of privacy profiles it is hard to find a balance between compactness
and separation of clusters while trying to produce a meaningful classification.
To that, another possible reason can be related to the imperfect performance
of the chosen clustering algorithms. Both algorithms, FCM and PAM, try to
find hyper spherical shapes of clusters whereas, if to observe the visualisation
of data points in the presented plots, a possible three well-separated ellipsoidal
shapes can be distinguished. Only PAM as a consequence of the calculation of
covariance between variables in the Mahalanobis distance formula succeeded to
detect some of the existing ellipsoidal forms in the dataset (see Fig. 3.16, e.g.,
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Figure 3.15: PAM Mahalanobis c = 7
yellow cluster-2, grey cluster-3). The behaviour of searching ellipsoidal forms is a
characteristic of the Gustafson-Kessel clustering algorithm (Gustafson & Kessel
[1979]). Using di erent clustering approaches with di erent distance measures
is intentionally performed to further use this information for recommendation
calculation. Visualisation of clustering results presented the di erence in cluster
results, therefore, the next section describes in detail the characteristics of fuzzy
privacy profiles.
3.3.3 Discussion of fuzzy privacy profiles
To demonstrate the characteristics of fuzzy privacy profiles Fig. 3.17 depicts the
vector of each calculated cluster centroid (based on FCM-Euclidean with 4 clus-
ters) and vectors of three user privacy profiles. The axes of the radar chart rep-
resent data types and the values of axes represent a sharing decision of this data
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Figure 3.16: PAM Mahalanobis c = 6
type to an audience. It can be clearly seen that users in the cluster 1 are highly
privacy-preserved and keep their profile’s data types private and unshared, allow-
ing only friends the possibility to contact them. In contrast, in cluster 4 users’
privacy profiles distinguished as totally public, whereas clusters 3 and 2 have
users with various privacy preferences per each data type. Users in cluster 3 set
their privacy settings to friends for most of the data types. Users in cluster 2
prefer to keep private personal information and vote intention private, their re-
lations and activity on the platform visible to friends of friends and other data
set up visible to public. The FCM algorithm assigned user-181 to the cluster 4
with the highest membership degree value m = 0.99. The privacy profile vector
of the user-181 is perfectly aligned with the vector of the corresponding centroid,
meaning that user-181 agrees across all dimensions with cluster 4 centroid, which
has visibility preferences set to public. On the other side the user-139 was also
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User-181 User-139 User-12 
Cluster-1 Cluster-2 Cluster-3 Cluster-4
Figure 3.17: Cluster centroids and users’ privacy profile vectors
assigned to the cluster 4. At this point, in the case of traditional sharp clustering,
we only have this information that user-139 belongs to this cluster. However, the
beneficial side of the fuzzy clustering is that it provides additional information,
such that user-139 belongs to the cluster 4 with the highest membership degree
of m = 0.36 but he also attains similarity to the cluster 2 with the membership
degree of m = 0.27, to cluster 3 with m = 0.24, and to cluster 1 with m = 0.13.
This is a genuine example of the multidimensional privacy profile, where 50%
of users’ privacy decisions agreed with the sharply assigned cluster centroid. Thus,
the classification of this user is in a gradual manner to all clusters. As seen from
the user-139 privacy profile, he does not agree with cluster 4 on the privacy
decision related to “MyActivity”. In that case, cluster 4 would suggest opening
this data to the public, whereas cluster 2 would recommend opening it only to
friends of friends. Moreover, cluster 2 has more restrictive visibility preferences
with regard to “VoteIntention” data type compared to the initial user’s privacy
decision. Based on that, one privacy suggestion might be that the user-139 can
be recommended either to share “MyActivity” data to public according to cluster
1 and to restrict “VoteIntention” to be visible only to friends, according to cluster
2. Another example includes the user-12 privacy profile vector which has been
assigned to cluster 4 with the highest membership degree of m = 0.33, and it also
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belongs to the cluster 2 with degree of m = 0.28 and cluster 3 with m = 0.26.
The graph of user-12 indicates that it does not totally agree with the centroid
cluster 4, but the user agrees with cluster-2 on MyRelations visibility, and with
cluster 3 on data related to Contact sharing decision. However not all profiles
possess such characteristics, for instance user-181 has a multidimensional profile,
but his privacy decisions are similar across all dimensions.
Having additional insights on users’ privacy preferences gives more options
for the design of privacy suggestions as well as increasing its precision. Using
sharp classification, saying, for example, that users in the cluster-4 are “privacy
liberals”, in our case makes an exact classification for the user-181, however, it
simultaneously discriminates the user-139 privacy opinion regarding other data
types, which are more private. Thus, nuances of user privacy preferences can be
well detected with the fuzzy clustering. How to use this information as an advan-
tage to personalisation of privacy recommendation is described in Chap. 4. The
associated risks may increase by assigning a class label on a sharply identified
cluster and neglecting those observations that di erentiate from others within
that cluster. This demonstrates the multidimensionality of user privacy profiles
where user privacy decision varies per di erent data item. To this, the fuzzy par-
titioning of the dataset may produce a more accurate representation of clusters
which can possibly help to calculate more personalised privacy recommendations.
The advantageous property of fuzzy clustering is that it assigns a membership
degree value for each observation, showing to what extent the user possesses in-
trinsic features of each cluster in the dataset. This advantage can help capture
the problem of multidimensionality of user privacy profiles, and assist in avoid-
ing a discriminative sharp classification (e.g., user-12 and user-139). There are
few studies that observed users’ privacy profiles with the support of a clustering
technique (Knijnenburg et al. [2013], Wisniewski et al. [2017]). There are several
reasons for this, firstly, as the clustering technique is a type of machine learning
a su cient data of user privacy profiles needs to be obtained to build an accu-
rate and robust user privacy model. Also, when considering user privacy profiles
dataset, it is important to make a di erentiation between users’ privacy settings
and privacy preferences. The former represents users’ actual privacy behaviour on
the platform while the latter expresses their attitude for privacy and, in this case,
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is important to consider the attitude-behaviour gap (privacy paradox) to avoid
fallacious models. Secondly, privacy profiles used to be examined from the unidi-
mensional representation. Clustering in that case would be su cient, however, it
might produce poorer results and lead to an oversimplification of users’ privacy
behaviour, both actual and attitudinal. To that, Knijnenburg et al. [2013] stated
that privacy profiles are more than unidimensional representation where, on the
contrary, they have a multidimensional structure. Multidimensionality provides
additional information for modelling user privacy profiles. Thirdly, depending
on the dataset, most often the initial number of clusters for privacy profiles is
unknown. Assigning the cluster labels downgrades the privacy profile to a uni-
dimensional representation. Therefore, unsupervised clustering technique will be
relevant to observe existing tendencies among privacy profiles, though without
relating to a particular cluster label for the sake of preserving a multidimensional
characteristic of the profile.
3.4 User evaluation of privacy behaviour
Lederer et al. [2004] state that existing systems still make it di cult for people
to manage their privacy, and designs of these systems inhibit people’s abilities
to both understand the privacy implications of their use and to conduct socially
meaningful actions through them. When confronted with a realistic description
of a privacy scenario, users’ disclosure preferences di er from what they had
previously considered they would be, which is a vivid example of privacy paradox1.
This section is dedicated to the evaluation of users’ privacy behaviours on
the Participa Inteligente platform to understand if there was a privacy paradox
e ect, if users’ actual behaviour diverge with initial privacy attitudes and the
reasons behind using default settings. The evaluation framework displayed in
Fig. 3.18 addresses users’ experience (EXP) of using privacy management tool
(OSA) which allowed to set up privacy settings for users’ profiles. In particular, if
the users had default privacy settings – was it set as an actual privacy preference,
or it is only the intention. The underlying reasons of having default settings are
1More information on privacy paradox is in Chap. 2
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explored by the possible e ect of lack of knowledge (how to use privacy settings),
or simply by forgetting to change default privacy settings. If the user did not
use default privacy settings it is evaluated how frequently the user changed her
privacy settings and if it was easy to use the privacy management tool for that.
Additionally, a possible e ect of users’ personal characteristics on their privacy
behaviour is investigated. The next sections describe in detail every aspect of
this framework.
3.4.1 Objective system aspect
Privacy controls provided by online platforms are heavily underexploited by users.
Previous research showed that users are less likely to change default privacy
settings (Gross & Acquisti [2005]), while more recent research demonstrate that
users tend to change default settings to a reasonable extent (Dey et al. [2012];
Stutzman et al. [2012]). Di erent factors could distance users from changing their
default privacy settings. One of the issues is the complexity of privacy controls,
so that users are having troubles correctly configuring their privacy settings. For
example, the lack of a user-friendly design indicated to be a major problem in
making privacy controls work and demonstrated that “users are overtaxed with
existing privacy schemes” (Reinhardt et al. [2015]).
The design of the privacy management tool on the platform potentially creates
limitations and barriers for expressing one’s privacy preferences. It may define
Figure 3.18: Evaluation framework of user privacy behaviours.
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the extent of privacy users can have on the platform and influence user’s experi-
ence with their privacy. On the Participa Intelligente (PI) platform the privacy
management tool was developed according to the user privacy profile framework
mentioned in Fig. 3.5. In the dataset form it represents a sharing matrix (see
Table 3.2, Table 3.5), where the rows of the matrix represent users, the columns
represent data types and the cell values indicate the defined sharing decision of
the data to a particular audience. However, privacy behaviours can go beyond the
simple sharing matrix and can be defined through more complex schemas. For
example, Wisniewski et al. [2017] investigated user privacy behaviours in terms
of features and settings that Facebook users apply as mechanism for managing
interpersonal boundaries. Authors also identified feature awareness that shows
to which degree the user knows/recognises a particular interface feature or func-
tionality that allows them to perform a particular privacy task. This is very
important factor as it determines to what extent users are capable of addressing
their privacy. In our study, we evaluate how the privacy management tool de-
ployed on the platform a ects user experience when expressing personal privacy
preferences.
3.4.2 User experience
On PI platform users are allowed to define their privacy settings when creating
their account. In addition, on the main page of the platform, users logged into
their accounts have a direct access to the privacy settings configuration page. In
PI platform privacy settings are set up by default to “public” visibility. Therefore,
the disadvantage of the current privacy management tool is that it is not possible
to identify whether the default settings were left unchanged by users’ personal
intention by simply skipping this step, or probably did not understand how to
use this functionality and, later, simply forget to change their privacy settings.
The reason for the “defaultism” tendency may be caused by the “privacy
paradox” e ect, for example, when a user with a high privacy concern attitude
leaves default settings unchanged which uncover her data to all users on the
platform. Even though being a privacy concerned person, the user’s actual privacy
behaviour diverges with his initial privacy attitudes. Justifying reasons for the
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“defaultism” tendency in configuring privacy settings can be related to the feature
awareness of the current privacy management tool, in other words, due to the
user’s lack of knowledge on privacy management on the platform. Young & Quan-
Haase [2009] reported that students are often unaware, or have forgotten, what
information they have disclosed and what privacy settings they have activated.
In addition, Acquisti & Gross [2006] stated that the majority of Facebook users
realise the true visibility of their profiles, however, the significant minority of
users are still underestimating the visibility borderlines of their profiles.
Studies of Kang et al. [2015]; Sawaya et al. [2017] show that knowledge on
computer-security does not necessarily, in reality, lead people to behave more
securely, or that it is not the main factor driving actual computer-security be-
haviour. Similar to users’ disclosure behaviour, knowing how to change your
privacy settings will not substantially a ect your actual disclosure behaviour.
Therefore, we want to investigate if users used default settings as they were un-
aware how to use the privacy management tool on the platform; if not, was the
other reason of using default settings because they just forgot to change them.
Also, for those users who had actually configured their privacy settings on the
platform, we wanted to know how often a user changed his profile privacy set-
tings (frequency). To that, the user interface plays an important role if users were
easily able to configure their privacy preferences (ease of use).
3.4.3 Personal characteristics
Personal user characteristics may have an e ect on the user’s experience in re-
gard to the privacy management tool. Quercia et al. [2012] reported that men
are more likely to publicly share privacy-sensitive fields. Moreover, even if both
genders share an equal amount of private information, only men tend to expand
the visibility beyond their social circles. In addition, Hoy & Milne [2010] showed
that women are more likely to undertake proactive self-protective behaviours,
and believe that it is important to be knowledgeable on the use of their per-
sonal information. However, studies of Yao et al. [2007] and Sawaya et al. [2017]
demonstrate that gender has no direct or indirect impact on privacy concerns on
online platforms and on actual privacy behaviour. As the aforementioned stud-
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ies provide conflicting results with regards gender e ect on privacy concerns and
behaviour, in our evaluation we will investigate if the e ect of gender occurred
on our platform. Additionally, in the study by Cho et al. [2009] he showed that
older female users were more concerned with online privacy than their younger,
male counterparts. Therefore, the age of users can have an e ect on their privacy
behaviours, thus, it is also included in our evaluation model.
Similar to gender, the culture of users a ects the various visibility tendency
of privacy profiles. Studies report that online users from individualistic countries
express higher privacy concerns, while users from collectivistic countries are likely
to exhibit less private behaviour online and to be less concerned about online
privacy. Moreover, the cultural variability may be one of the reasons for the
existence of the privacy paradox (Li et al. [2017], Sawaya et al. [2017], Cho et al.
[2009]). The users in our study are representatives of a single nationality, which
is represented by citizens of Ecuador. Therefore, the culture factor is included in
the framework, however, it has no comparative evaluation. In addition, users on
PI platform can be di erentiated by two roles: voters and political members. The
majority of users are represented by voters, while only six users are representatives
of political parties. The user-role on platforms have a substantial e ect on privacy
behaviours. As the number of users from political parties is significantly less
than voters, the user-role factor is included in the evaluation framework but not
considered for further analysis.
3.4.4 Evaluation analysis
The user evaluation is conducted in a form of an online survey. The survey
commenced on June 5th, 2017 and ended on July 31st, 2017. The questions
related to our evaluation framework are outlined in Sect. B.1, Table B.1. The
dataset of collected user responses consists of 67 users’ answers. Among them,
19 females, 47 males and 1 user did not provide gender information. The age
is between 23 and 39 years old (median age is 31). Among those users 61 are
citizens and 6 are representatives of the political party. The minimum time used
to answer all questions was 18.44 seconds and the maximum time was 324.22
seconds (mean 53.19 seconds).
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Independent variables analysis
Figure 3.19: Relations between variables with p < 0.3
As the survey questions were presented is a guided structure, the resulted
dataset is underpowered and does not have significant inferences. However,
among those insignificant results, there are some interesting observations worth
discussing. The Chi-square test and t-test (bootstrapping) was run on the dataset.
As the data sample is small, we used values of Chi-square test with Yates’ con-
tinuity corrections. Among all insignificant relations we will shortly discuss the
relations that inferred the significance values of Pearson’s Chi-squared test with
Yates’ continuity corrections with significance values at least p<0.3.
There was a significant association between actual privacy behaviour and
user’s forgetting tendency to change privacy settings with X2(1) = 3.86, p<0.05.
The odds of users having default privacy settings as they forgot to change it
were 4.857 times higher than users having default privacy setting intentionally
(i.e. they did not forget to change them) (95% CI: [1.007006, 24.68733]). This
significant finding reflects that when users do forget to change privacy settings
approximately 77.27% of users’ accounts have default privacy settings and 22.72%
do not, whereas when users do not forget to change privacy settings, only 58.82%
are without default settings and 41.17% of users stay with default settings. There-
fore, we can conclude that people who use default privacy settings mostly do so
as they simply forget to change their privacy settings. However, even if some
users do not forget to change privacy settings, there are some who prefer to stay
with the default settings. The relation between users’ attitude privacy behaviour
and their knowledge on how to change privacy settings displayed an association
70
User evaluation of privacy behaviour
with X2(1) = 1.284108, p= 0.2571366. Among users who did not know how to
change privacy settings, 75% were with a negative attitude of having a public
privacy setting, while only 25% were with a positive attitude of being public.
Moreover, those users who knew where/how to change privacy settings were al-
most equally represented by both groups (47.059% positive to be public against
52.941%). This, actually, looks quite unexpected as we tend to assume that those
people who care about privacy, according to their attitudes, surely tend to know
where/how to change the privacy settings (could be related to “privacy paradox”
e ect, such as – “I care about my privacy, but I don’t make an e ort to figure
out how to change my default privacy settings.”). Thus, it was not found that
knowing how to change privacy settings was substantially a ected by the user’s
disclosure behaviour intentions.
The findings also showed that age has, although insignificant, some e ect on
variables such as knowledge and tendency to forget changing default settings. On
average users who did not know how to change privacy settings tend to be 9 years
younger than users who know how to change defaults settings. This di erence
was not significant t (39.989) = -1.83, p = 0.075; however, it represents almost a
medium-size e ect r = 0.277. Less significantly, compared to knowledge, the age
has an e ect on users’ forgetting tendency. On average older users did not forget
to change their default privacy settings, while their younger counterparts tend to
forget. The di erence was not significant t (32.285) = 1.17, p = 0.252, and it
represents a small-size e ect r = 0.201. Based on those findings, it is assumed
that the older the user the more carefully she approaches the configuration of
privacy settings.
Combined variable analysis
For further analysis, we have created a combined variable which reflects if user’s
privacy behaviour is consistent or not. The variable combines the actual privacy
behaviour and attitude privacy behaviour values. This variable can be repre-
sented in two conditions: first – consistent privacy behaviour (Q1&Q4=Yes AND
Q1&Q4=No), second – inconsistent privacy behaviour (Q1=Yes&Q4=No AND
Q1=No&Q4=Yes).
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Figure 3.20: Relation between combined variable and knowledge
There is an insignificant association between users’ consistent privacy be-
haviour and knowledge on privacy settings with X2(1) = 1.284108, p = 0.25.
Among those users who knew how to change privacy settings, 8 users had consis-
tent privacy behaviour, while 9 users were inconsistent. Not surprisingly, among
users who did not know how to change privacy settings the majority (75%)
were users with inconsistent privacy behaviours against users with consistent
behaviours of 42.8%. This result may possibly conclude that as more users are
consistent with their privacy behaviour, they generally tend to figure out how
to change default privacy settings, while users with inconsistent behaviours are
mostly unaware about privacy settings on the platform. Both groups of people,
consistent and inconsistent, found the privacy management tool neutrally easy
to use. However, those who disagreed with the ease of use (6 out of 7 users)
were reported by users with inconsistent privacy behaviours. The time spent to
answer the survey has been also used to analyse the population. We found that,
on average, people with consistent behaviours (M=61.26 sec) spend 19 seconds
more answering the survey questions than people with inconsistent behaviours
(M=46.99 sec).
3.5 Conclusions
To conclude the preliminary user evaluation, the actual use of the default settings
might be explained by people’s forgetting tendency to change default settings. We
might expect that user’s knowledge (feature awareness) about privacy settings can
be explained by their privacy concerns (e.g., people with high privacy concerns
might know how to change privacy settings), however the preliminary results
showed the opposite – people with protective privacy attitudes still did not know
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how to use privacy settings. However, knowledge, can be explained by the user’s
consistent privacy behaviour. Age seems to play an important role on users’
knowledge and the tendency to forget to change initial privacy settings. Users
with consistent behaviours considered the survey more carefully by taking more
time to answer questions rather than inconsistent users. It must be taken into
account that these results can not be generalised because they a ected by two
other context variables: it is focused on the one culture representatives (citizens
of Ecuador), and the platform context relates to the political participation which
also a ects users disclosure behaviour. Based on the results of this study it
can be shown that users need a privacy-decision support in a form of a privacy
recommendations.
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Chapter4
Fuzzy-based Privacy Settings
Recommender System
4.1 Conceptual developement
4.1.1 Overview of the existing systems
Due to the fact that individuals each have a di erent perception on privacy con-
cerns, it becomes complicated to find the ultimate privacy policy that fulfils all
the users’ needs. Previous research frameworks for privacy recommendations
mostly focused on a unidimensional privacy profile representation (Munemasa &
Iwaihara [2011]; Naini et al. [2015]) and, in rare cases, contextualised frameworks
are used where other factors including the trustworthiness of the information re-
cipients, information sensitivity or other privacy attitudes are considered in the
model (Bahirat et al. [2018]; Dong et al. [2016]). Presented in the following sec-
tions privacy recommender systems are described for the following reasons: the
privacy wizard is the one of the earliest works on developing an automated pri-
vacy management support tool; the personalised privacy assistant system is the
latest practical solution that combines results of several years of research; and
YourPrivacyProtector is an example of an interesting approach but with weak
technical rationale.
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Privacy Wizard
Fang & LeFevre [2010] proposed a privacy wizard which aims to automatically
configure user’s privacy settings with minimal e ort from the user. The main
engine of the wizard is the privacy preference model classifier which solicits data
input from two parts of the system architecture: user input and feature extrac-
tion. It collects users’ answers to questions related to their privacy preferences,
in particular, the sharing preference of the specific data to a particular person in
their social network. At the same time it extracts features from the user’s neigh-
bourhood (list of friends) structure and general profile data, such as gender, age,
education, etc. In addition, their classifier model uses active learning which helps
handle the limits of the user’s e ort to assign labels to their friends’ network.
Afterwards, the model was used to automatically configure user privacy settings,
thus, reducing user e ort. Certainly, it is important to consider the user’s e ort in
configuring personalised privacy settings, however, in this case it was not proven,
in terms of accuracy, that the relation to a user’s list of friends provides adequate
information. In addition, the user input for the classifier was based on the binary
user answers such as “yes”; “no”. The binarization of user’s sharing preferences
oversimplifies user privacy perceptions. Also, the authors mentioned that a man-
ual labelling of a user’s 25 friends increases the average accuracy to over 90%.
A possible drawback of this system may appear with users having less privacy
concerns. They may experience cognitive laziness or “configuration fatigue” by
skipping the required configuration limit of settings which may, in turn, a ect
the accuracy of the proposed automation. Again, this can be criticised towards
the additional user e ort and eventually “configuration fatigue”.
YourPrivacyProtector
Ghazinour et al. [2013] suggest a recommender system which aims to assist peo-
ple in using their privacy settings in social media. Their system is based on
defined user profiles which include attributes related to the user’s personal data
(name, gender, birthdate, education, etc.), their interests (movies, books, politics,
etc.) and their privacy settings on photo albums. Based on this data, the sys-
tem classifies user’s privacy behaviour into three categories, such as “ignorant”,
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“pragmatic”, and “fundamentalist”, which was proposed by Westin [1968]. These
behaviour categories help to understand the attitude towards privacy settings in
terms of their interests and published content. Users are classified using decisions
trees rules to derive user profiles based on the above-mentioned categories. Then,
the system calculates recommendations using the k-nearest neighbour (KNN)
algorithm. It matches similar profiles to the target user and then provides rec-
ommendations if certain information should be hidden or disclosed. In general,
the proposed recommender system is based on the intuition of the collaborative
filtering (Herlocker et al. [2000]), where the similarity between the target user’s
privacy preferences and other users who share common privacy preferences is cal-
culated. However, several critical moments can be addressed towards it. In their
work, even though having the multidimensional structure of user’s profiles, their
model downsizes user profiles into a unidimensional categorisation which over-
looks di erent disclosing tendencies per each data attributes. Also, the training
dataset of their model is based on the binary sharing values (“disclose”; “not dis-
close”), which neglects the granularity of a user’s sharing decision. Finally, the
recommender system was missing the evaluation and justification of the optimal
values of K-neighbours in the KNN-classification algorithm. Thus, this system is
a demonstrative example of a sharp classification of users’ privacy profiles.
Personalised privacy assistant
Recent work of Liu et al. [2016] presents a personalised privacy assistant (PPA)
which facilitates a users’ privacy permissions management for mobile applica-
tions. The privacy permission settings for mobile application allow the decision
to allow or deny third party application access to data stored on a user’s mobile
device. Granting permissions to third parties also relates to privacy issues. In
this way, the PPA’s main focus is on modelling a users’ privacy preferences using
privacy profiles. Once a set of privacy profiles is defined, a target user is assigned
to the profile that is best matched according to the specific characteristics of
that profile. Eventually, based on this assignment, the user is recommended with
personalised permission settings. The PPA builds privacy profiles using hierar-
chical clustering with varied distance measures (Euclidean, Manhattan, Cosine)
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and with an evaluation of the optimal number of clusters, which appeared to be
seven. With regards profiling, the user is asked a set of dynamically-generated
questions to infer his privacy preferences and, based on the results, is assigned
the closest cluster. For the recommendation calculation a SVM classifier has been
used so that PPA passes user’s features (answers to questions) to the classifier to
determine recommendations for privacy settings learned from the training data
(seven profiles). Subsequently, PPA displays the list of grouped per permission
purpose settings recommendations. Finally, PPA proposes three options of rec-
ommendation adaptation that the user can accept: all shown recommendations,
selectively accept some recommendations, and reject all recommendations. Actu-
ally, this study supports previous research where a common occurring issue in a
real-world privacy settings datasets is where a majority of users’ privacy settings
configuration are set to default values (Gross & Acquisti [2005]; Kaskina [2018b];
Liu et al. [2011]). Having a prevailing number of default privacy settings in the
privacy profile training may a ect the model’s accuracy. For the sake of the
model’s accuracy, it is desirable to know the underlying reasons why users tend
to use default settings. In addition, not every user can perfectly fit to only one
cluster where, most likely, the user can possess characteristics of several profiles
(Kaskina [2018b]).
4.1.2 Fuzzy-based privacy settings recommender system
(FPRS)
This section introduces the conceptual model for a novel approach of calculat-
ing privacy recommendations based on the static privacy profiles. A fuzzy-based
privacy recommender system (FPRS) concentrates beyond the multidimensional
structure and eliminates discriminative tendencies that appears in traditional
classification of privacy profiles by using the results of fuzzy clustering parti-
tioning. Fig. 4.1 displays the proposed framework of the system where each
component is described in detail below.
Citizen privacy profile framework. The citizen privacy profile framework
described in Sect. 3.1.2, measures a users’ actual privacy behaviour on the plat-
form. It contains three objects – the citizen, the data levels and the audience
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Figure 4.1: Fuzzy-based privacy recommender system
levels; and two possible interactions – the status (share or hide). This framework
di ers from others by allowing users to set up their visibility preferences to some
level of granularity. The implementation of this part is presented in Sect. 2.3.
Database storage. The database stores two di erent tables. The first stores
citizens’ current privacy settings that has been derived from the privacy frame-
work, and the second table stores calculated privacy recommendations that will
be presented to citizens. The specification of the database storage depends on
the scalability of the system. In this work a relational MySQL database is used.
CPP modeling. A distinctive part of this framework is that it introduces the
concept of fuzzy privacy profiles for the citizen privacy profile modelling. Fuzzy
clustering allows objects to be associated with many clusters according to their
membership degree value, based on the fuzzy set theory introduced by Zadeh
[1965]. It may be an oversimplification problem if relying on a uni- or even multi-
dimensional classification of disclosure behaviours, therefore, this framework sug-
gests considering privacy profiles not only as multidimensional, but also as fuzzy.
To the best of our knowledge this is a first attempt to interpret the multidimen-
sionality and inherent vagueness of user privacy preferences using a fuzzy logic
approach. This framework demonstrates to what extent the nuances of citizen
privacy behaviours can be captured with the help of fuzzy profile modelling.
Automation. Once the citizen privacy profile framework is defined and the
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set of privacy profiles is modelled, the next step is the automation of the pri-
vacy recommendations. For the recommendations calculation a novel approach is
proposed and utilises an inferred information from fuzzy clustering results. The
implementation of this component is presented in the next section Sect. 4.2. One
of the missing parts of the proposed framework is the design of a recommendation
presentation to the user. Do we intend to present it as a nudge, or as a list? What
action upon the recommendation is the user provided with? Extensive research
has been conducted on designing the presentation to the user (Acquisti et al.
[2017]; Balebako et al. [2011]; Wang et al. [2014]), however, it is out of scope of
this research.
4.2 Implementation of FPRS
4.2.1 Prototype architecture
Fig. 4.2 presents an architecture of the implemented privacy settings recom-
mender system. The architecture consists of two web-servers: Participa In-
teligente web-server hosts the CPP framework, MySQL database and user browser
display the user interface of the application; ShinyServer web-server hosts the
CPP modelling of the conceptual model (see Fig. 4.1) and the application itself
is developed in RStudio. The shiny application consists of three R scripts, where
Figure 4.2: Architecture of fuzzy-based privacy recommender system
the UI.R file runs the user interface of the application, Rec.R file is the server side
of the application where the connection to the database and the calculation of the
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recommendation is performed, Assessment.R script is dedicated to the user eval-
uation of the system as described in the Sect. 4.3.5. All .R scripts main functions
are developed using RStudio packages.
4.2.2 Recommendations calculation
This section presents privacy recommendations calculation based on user privacy
profile models as previously described. Before explaining the recommendation
algorithm, we recall the advantages of fuzzy clustering. The fuzzy clustering
helps to define a structure in unclear and undistinctive data by indicating to
what degree each observation belongs to every cluster found in the data. Fuzzy
clustering can detect di erentiated inclination of users’ privacy preferences per
given data type.
The calculation of privacy recommendations based on fuzzy clustering results
is straightforward. We use a set of cluster centroids and the membership degrees
for each observation as calculated by fuzzy clustering, and then use weighted av-
erage mean (WAM) to aggregate final recommendation values for each dimension
(data type). In the prototype1, the WAM is calculated using R package “agop”2.
Thus, the recommended privacy setting Sj for a given user, for a particular data
level “j”, is as follows:
Sj =
qc
i=1(sj i ú µi)qc
i=1 µi
(4.1)
where, c is the number of clusters defined as a result of FCM or PAM clustering
algorithms; sj i is a privacy setting calculated for each user where j is a partic-
ular data level and i is an index of the cluster centroid; and µi are membership
values related to the cluster centroid i. Thus, a cluster’s privacy suggestion for a
particular user is considered in accordance with his membership degree (weight)
belonging to that cluster. In this way, conversely from classic sharp clustering,
we consider fuzzy user privacy profile model where opinions of all clusters are
integrated in a weighted manner for the final privacy recommendation.
The Fig. 4.3 shows the calculation example of a privacy recommendation for
User-50 using FCM algorithm with Euclidean distance. For every data type a
1https://participacioninteligente.org/survey-privacy
2https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/agop/agop.pdf
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Figure 4.3: Recommendation for User-50
WAM is calculated according to User-50’s membership values to every cluster in
the dataset. Thus, the recommendation suggests User-50 open the MyActivity
data on the platform to friends, while the contactability restricts the public to
friends of friends. Also, this algorithm understands that User-50 can open his
vote intention from private to friends and restrict the visibility of his political
topics from public to friends of friends. The algorithm agrees with the User’s-50
initial privacy setting on two data types, MyRelations and PersonalInformation,
producing the same visibility values to be opened to friends only. The resulted
privacy recommendation appears extremely interesting. Why does the algorithm
decide that a user should be more open on her activity and vote intention data,
while being more restrictive on her political topics and contactability. Clearly,
this outcome is an interplay of the chosen distance metric, the algorithm itself, the
way of the initiation of cluster centroids and the existing population of the data.
However, the question what will the recommendation be for those data types if
the cluster centroids were not initiated as an artificial means in the dataset (case
of FCM), however, were taken as some real representatives (case of fuzzy PAM)
of the dataset should be raised.
It is su ciently evident that each clustering algorithm has di erent behaviours
and goals. However, which one works best for the privacy profiles analysis and
further recommendation calculation? At this moment it can be clearly identi-
fied that, while clustering privacy profiles, two factors should be considered: the
initiation of cluster centroids and the distance metric. Although, note not all
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clustering algorithms uses distance metric. This is a case of the Gustafson-Kessel
algorithm which uses a covariance matrix instead of distance metric to detect
ellipsoidal forms of clusters, and which has similar results with PAM clustering
with Mahalanobis distance. Also, an interesting comparison of recommendation
calculation can be made with collaborative filtering (Herlocker et al. [2000]). This
algorithm is common and widely used in e-Commerce recommender systems. In
particular, the comparison can be made with user-user collaborative filtering. An
intuitive algorithm of this method is that it selects relevant neighbourhoods of
user by comparing a target user’s profile vector with all user’s profiles based on
similarity measures like Pearson correlation, cosine or spearman rank correla-
tion. Out of all similarities among users, only the top-N users to a target user
are selected, and then the score rating for an item is calculated based on the
ratings of the most top similar users weighted by the values of similarity. In
our recommendation method, the selected set of the most similar users can be
related to our set of cluster centroids. The score for the item (in our case for
a data type) is calculated by multiplying centroid scores with the membership
degree according to the objective function of the clustering algorithm. In fact,
among cluster centroids there is only one most similar centroid, while the rest
are representatives of other user models. The property of using opinions from
di erent models (clusters) can possibly superinduce the diversity and serendipity
in recommendations. The next section discusses which fuzzy clustering algorithm
(FCM or PAM), in combination with di erent distance metrics, provide the most
accurate recommendations.
4.2.3 Evaluation of recommendations accuracy
In general, the best recommendation is the one that perfectly matches the users’
preferences. As we assume that users have already expressed their privacy prefer-
ences by defining their privacy settings on their Participa Inteligente accounts on
the platform, we investigate the accuracy of calculated recommendations com-
pared to users’ initial privacy settings. Thus, the error results between users’
actual and recommended privacy settings is compared. If the prediction error
is low between actual and recommended settings, this signifies that the privacy
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recommendation is close to users’ preference. If the prediction error is high,
then the recommended privacy settings are su ciently di erent from users’ ini-
tial privacy settings. The list of outlined accuracy metrics was calculated using R
package “Metrics”1. These metrics measure the accuracy of provided privacy rec-
ommendations when compared with the initial dataset of users’ privacy settings
(baseline). The baseline was compared with models built upon the following algo-
rithms: fuzzy Partitioning Around Medoids (PAM) clustering with Mahalanobis,
Manhattan and Euclidean distances and Fuzzy C-means (FCM) clustering with
Manhattan and Euclidean distances. To avoid overfitting problem, the 10-fold
cross validation of each recommender algorithm model was calculated based on
validity indexes presented in Table 3.13.
The results displayed in Table 4.2 suggest in the agreement of MAE, MSE,
RMSE and CE metrics the best prediction is produced using an FCM algorithm
with Euclidean distance of 2 cluster partition. As per the ACC metric the best
accuracy of recommendations is achieved with an FCM Euclidean distance of
15 cluster solutions, whereas APE suggest FCM with Manhattan distance with 9
clusters is the preferred method. PAM clustering algorithms’ results are displayed
in Table 4.3. APE, MAE, RMSE and CE metrics show that the best accuracy
is performed by PAM Manhattan distance with 15 clusters. The ACC metric
indicates the best accuracy using a PAM Mahalanobis distance with 2 clusters,
and MSE demonstrates the best predicted privacy settings recommendation using
PAM Manhattan with 6 clusters. Moreover, to compare results between the two
FCM-based and PAM-based algorithm models, the highest accuracy is performed
with the former. The result can be influenced by the fact that, unlike with PAM
algorithms where cluster centroids initialised from the dataset, FCM calculates
clusters as artificial weighted means which supposedly functions better with a in-
distinguishable and vague dataset (low dissimilarity). As previously highlighted,
there is a low dissimilarity of privacy profiles ( Sect. 3.3.1), thereof, the presented
clustering models, above, attempt to divide the data into 2 clusters, to separate
vectors as granular as possible, so that vectors can be di erentiated. If the rec-
ommender system intends to provide highly accurate recommendations that will
di er slightly from the users’ initial privacy settings, then this solution might be
1https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/Metrics/Metrics.pdf
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Table 4.1: Overview of accuracy metrics
Name Formula Description
Accuracy ACC = TP+TNTP+FP+FN+TN The proportion of elements in ac-
tual privacy settings that are equal
to the corresponding element in pre-
dicted ones.
Absolute per-
cent error
APE = qni=1 |Ai≠Pi|Ai The element-wise absolute percent
di erence between actual and pre-
dicted privacy settings.
Mean abso-
lute error
MAE =
qn
i=1 |yi≠xi|
n The average absolute di erence be-
tween actual and predicted privacy
settings.
Mean squared
error
MSE = 1n
qn
i=1(Yi ≠ Yˆi) The average squared di erence be-
tween actual and predicted privacy
settings.
Classification CEi = fn ◊ 100 The proportion of elements in ac-
tual privacy settings that are not
equal to the corresponding element
in predicted.
appropriate. However, such partitions do not provide a meaningful classification
of the privacy profiles. If the goal is to derive the privacy profile types (personas)
existing in the dataset, then FCM with 9 clusters and PAM with 6 cluster would
be more relevant but the accuracy will su er slightly. Moreover, such recommen-
dations can have more diversity or novelty by virtue of its slight inaccuracy. In
such a situation, the decision must be taken by the system designer on how to
balance the trade-o  between accuracy of recommendations and the inference of
classification types.
Fig. 4.4 demonstrates privacy recommendations produced by models of a
FCM-Manhattan-9 and PAM-Manhattan-15 clustering result. User-117 privacy
profile is multidimensional, where user prefers to share MyActivity and MyTopics
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Table 4.2: 10-fold cross validation of FCM clustering
```````````````Algorithm
Metric ACC APE MAE MSE CE
FCM-Euc-2 0.42564 0.50192 0.65897 0.82821 0.57436
FCM-Euc-4 0.51026 0.37692 0.59744 0.81282 0.48974
FCM-Euc-5 0.52564 0.39274 0.60513 0.86667 0.47436
FCM-Euc-7 0.53846 0.34765 0.51282 0.61538 0.46154
FCM-Euc-15 0.69744 0.22179 0.35128 0.44872 0.30256
FCM-Mnh-2 0.53846 0.39637 0.55385 0.73846 0.46154
FCM-Mnh-6 0.56410 0.32265 0.46154 0.51282 0.43590
FCM-Mnh-9 0.69231 0.19444 0.43590 0.69231 0.30769
FCM-Mnh-11 0.66667 0.21795 0.43590 0.64103 0.33333
FCM-Mnh-13 0.60256 0.40171 0.58333 1.03205 0.39744
FCM-Mnh-15 0.62393 0.30912 0.43590 0.55556 0.37607
data to friends only. Also, by letting VoteIntention to be open to public, User-
117 then prefers to keep PersonalInformation and MyRelations data private. In
this case, recommendations generated by both FCM and PAM algorithms sug-
gest to set VoteIntention visible only to friends, and to compensate this decrease
of visibility by increasing the visibility of MyActivity and MyTopics to friends
of friends visibility, and PersonalInformation to friends instead of being hidden.
The FCM-based recommendation suggests if opening the MyRelations data vis-
ible to a friends of friends audience then the Contact settings should be closed
from public to friends of friends as well. Conversely, PAM-based recommenda-
tion considers keeping the Contact visible to public, while sharing MyRelations
information only to friends.
An example of User’s-79 initial settings ( Fig. 4.5) is more open where all data
types are visible to the public, except for the MyTopics data which is unshared.
For that, both FCM- and PAM-based suggestions agreed on recommending shar-
ing MyActivity, MyTopics and MyRelations to friends of friends and VoteIn-
tention visible to friends only. Both algorithms agree on the contact sharing
decision but disagree on privacy decision for the PersonalInfromation data. The
FCM-based recommendation regard sharing PersonalInformation data to friends
of friends and PAM suggests keeping it visible to friends only.
These examples demonstrate how two algorithms estimate di erently on the
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Table 4.3: 10-fold cross validation of PAM clustering
```````````````Algorithm
Metric ACC APE MAE MSE CE
PAM-Euc-2 0.38974 0.79530 0.94615 1.61795 0.61026
PAM-Euc-4 0.45385 0.45321 0.66410 0.90000 0.54615
PAM-Euc-15 0.62308 0.28419 0.48974 0.71538 0.37692
PAM-Mnh-2 0.46667 0.45556 0.61538 0.77949 0.53333
PAM-Mnh-3 0.55385 0.38248 0.54615 0.74615 0.44615
PAM-Mnh-5 0.50256 0.38419 0.53077 0.59744 0.49744
PAM-Mnh-6 0.53333 0.34316 0.50000 0.56667 0.46667
PAM-Mnh-15 0.63846 0.26218 0.44872 0.62308 0.36154
PAM-Mah-2 0.34615 0.83654 1.01795 1.74615 0.65385
PAM-Mah-6 0.50256 0.40000 0.61795 0.85897 0.49744
PAM-Mah-15 0.60769 0.30791 0.51538 0.76154 0.39231
sharing decision between various data types. In the first example two algorithms
were trading the visibility values between Contact and MyRelations data, whereas
in the second example, FCM and PAM algorithms produced di erent opinions
for the one data type. In such cases, the question of which algorithm produces
a more relevant privacy settings recommendations should be asked. The use-
ful insights can be inferred from user-centric evaluation of the privacy settings
recommendations which are presented in the next section.
Figure 4.4: Recommendation for User-117
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4.3 User evaluation of privacy recommendations
The analysis of privacy recommendations based on di erent fuzzy clustering al-
gorithms helped to outline the system aspects that need to be evaluated from
the user-centered perspective. There are two foundational frameworks related
to the user-centric evaluation of recommender systems. One of them is ResQue
framework, proposed by Pu et al. [2011] which postulates that perceived recom-
mendation quality, interface adequacy and interaction adequacy has a positive
e ects on users’ beliefs on perceived usefulness, transparency and ease of use of
received recommendations. Those beliefs, in turn, have causal e ects to their
attitudes and, subsequently, increased attitudes would finally a ect behavioural
intentions, such as intention to return or to recommend the system to friends.
However, this model does not allow establishing which specific perception ex-
plains the users’ experience related to a specific system feature. In addition, it
lacks the personalised perception of users towards their experience and attitudes.
To solve this problem, a more elaborate evaluation framework model was pre-
sented by Knijnenburg et al. [2012]. This framework helps to identify in which
way the system’s critical features (Objective Systems Aspects - OSA) are sub-
jectively perceived by a specific user (Subjective System Aspect - SSA), further
investigate how SSA influences user experience (EXP) and, finally, the interac-
tion (INT) with the system. Thus, this framework helps to identify the e ects of
OSA on SSA, EXP and INT. The distinguishing part of this framework is that it
Figure 4.5: Recommendation for User-79
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considers SSA as the opportunity to measure mediating e ects of OSA on EXP
and to increase the robustness of the link between them. For example, if di erent
algorithms will have high satisfaction outcomes, this experience may be due to
a high value of perceived quality recommendation in the case of the first algo-
rithm, while the outcome satisfaction of the second algorithm may be mediated
by the perceived recommendation sharpness. In addition, this framework consid-
ers other possible moderators of user experience, such as personal characteristics
(PC) and situational characteristics (SC). Hence, this framework proposes an or-
dered and well-structured model, arguing that the user experience is caused by
objective system aspects via subjective system aspects and personal or situational
characteristics. We will use this framework as blueprint to evaluate privacy rec-
ommendations calculated by fuzzy-based privacy settings recommender system.
Figure 4.6: Privacy recommendation evaluation framework
4.3.1 Objective system aspects
This section describes which system’s features will be evaluated by users and
introduces the concepts of sharp and soft privacy recommendations. Sharp rec-
ommendation means when the model generates privacy suggestions that are very
di erent from the user’s initial privacy settings. These are abrupt recommen-
dations, supposedly, which can evoke strong negative reactions of users. For
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example, if the user’s initial privacy settings tend to have low visibility prefer-
ences, such as “visible only to me”, a sharp recommendation will suggest opening
the data to be visible to “public”. Similarly, for the user privacy profile with open
privacy preferences, when having visibility settings to “public” the sharp rec-
ommendation will suggest to close visibility to “only me”. Consequently, sharp
recommendations can be subdivided to two types: liberal – over-disclosing ones,
and restrictive recommendations – under-disclosing recommendations.
Soft recommendation suggests privacy settings which are very close or almost
equal to the user’s initial privacy settings. This recommendation provides a
gradual change in user’s privacy settings. For example, if user’s privacy settings
tend to have visibility preferences “open only to me” the soft recommendation will
gently suggest opening only “to friends”, or even in some cases it will recommend
keeping the initial privacy setting of the user. In this case, if the user tends to
have “public” visibility, the soft recommendation will not abruptly suggest “Hey
you are in a danger zone by being public, you better close this data to be private
only to yourself”. Instead, it will suggest “Your data is visible to all public, would
you like making it visible to friends of friends?”. The soft recommendation might
avoid user reactance, unlike with sharp recommendations.
In Table 4.2, Table 4.3, the highest accuracy was scored by the APE metric
with Fuzzy C-means (FCM) Manhattan distance clustering with 9 clusters. This
means that the recommendation of privacy settings is very close to users’ initial
privacy settings. The advantage of this is that the privacy recommendation com-
promises user’s privacy preferences and is more likely to be accepted by the user
with a low negative reactance e ect. However, if the user’s initial privacy set-
tings are a priori known to be inconsistent (a ected by privacy paradox), then the
model with the highest accuracy will predict erroneous regularities. Therefore,
the most accurate algorithm is not necessarily to be the best option. Partitioning
Around Medoids (PAM) Manhattan distance clustering with 15 clusters scored
the second highest accuracy value, which has a lower prediction accuracy when
compared to the FCM algorithm. Then, in this case, the PAM algorithm tends
to predict irregularities in the dataset and provides sharper recommendations
as they diverge with user’s initial privacy preferences. These recommendations
might elicit a reactance-style response from users.
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Thus, by applying di erent clustering algorithms, the di erent types of recom-
mendations can be generated and be further utilised in the system. For example,
in the context when a user needs to be given more control over her privacy, or
when it is necessary to automate her privacy, the system will be able to provide
a relevant recommendation. In our case, soft recommendations favour the user’s
control, while sharp recommendations tend to automate user’s privacy. The user-
centric evaluation of this section aims to compare both fuzzy clustering algorithms
against the baseline system, which is represented by the users’ own privacy set-
tings. Also, the FCM-based recommendations are compared against PAM-based
recommendations. To this end, the objective system aspects under investigation
are two recommender models – FCM with 9 clusters and PAM with 15 clusters
(both using Manhattan distance), and the baseline – users’ own privacy settings.
To that, the following hypothesises are posed:
• H.1 Compared to the baseline system, FCM-based recommendations are
positively related with perceived recommendation quality, while PAM-based
recommendations are negatively related.
• H.2 Compared to the baseline system, FCM-based recommendations neg-
atively related with the perceived recommendation sharpness, while PAM-
based recommendations are positively related.
• H.3 The perceived recommendation quality is negatively associated with
users’ reactance experience, while the perceived recommendation sharpness
is positively associated with users’ reactance.
• H.4 The perceived recommendation quality is positively associated with
users’ satisfaction experience, while the perceived recommendation sharp-
ness is negatively associated with users’ satisfaction.
• H.5 The perceived recommendation quality is positively associated with
users’ persuasion to accept recommendations, while the perceived recom-
mendation sharpness is negatively associated with users’ persuasion.
• H.6 People with consistent privacy behaviour, when presented with soft
recommendations, will have the higher perceived recommendation quality
and the lower perceived recommendation sharpness, while people with in-
consistent privacy behaviour score low on the perceived quality of the rec-
ommendations and high on the perceived recommendation sharpness.
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• H.7 People with consistent privacy behaviour when presented with sharp
recommendations will have the lower perceived recommendation quality
and the higher perceived recommendation sharpness, while people with
inconsistent privacy behaviour score high on the perceived quality of the
recommendations and low on the perceived recommendation sharpness.
4.3.2 Subjective system aspects
Perceived recommendation sharpness
Objectively speaking, the accuracy of the recommendation provided by a di erent
algorithm can be quantitatively calculated. However, the level of recommendation
accuracy can be perceived di erently by a specific user. Therefore, the concepts
of sharp and soft recommendations will be evaluated by presenting the concept
of the users’ perceived recommendation sharpness (PSH). For example, the PSH
will be higher when users are presented with the sharp recommendation, and
lower when presented with the soft recommendation.
Perceived recommendation quality
The initial goal of the recommender system is to finely match the users’ interests,
preferences or attitudes. The quality of recommendations is one of the deter-
minants of a successful system. The recommender’s algorithm performance can
be measured by users according to their perceived quality. The perceived qual-
ity of recommendation can be associated with various metrics, such as perceived
accuracy of the recommendation, ease of use, usefulness, novelty, attractiveness,
etc. (Pu et al. [2011], Knijnenburg et al. [2011]). Although, the recommenda-
tion quality stands close to the recommendation accuracy we do not relate the
two as the recommendation accuracy relates much closer to perceived recommen-
dation sharpness. As the perceived recommendation quality can be explained
quite broadly, and to avoid the confusion between recommendation’s accuracy,
sharpness and quality, we will equate perceived recommendation quality with per-
ceived recommendation usefulness. According to Pu et al. [2011], the perceived
recommendation usefulness indicates to what extent users find the recommenda-
tion being useful, such as how the recommendation improves or facilitates user’s
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decision-making and improves their performance compared to their experience
without the recommender system’s aid (Pu et al. [2011]). Thus, the perceived
recommendation quality(PRQ) of our system will explain the user’s attitudes
towards the recommendation e ciency and e ectiveness in facilitating a user’s
privacy decision-making.
4.3.3 User experience
Persuasion e ect
The recommendation’s strength in changing user’s attitudes is associated with
a persuasion (PS) e ect in a recommender system. The main source of per-
suasion is the preference-elicitation-matching process (Tam & Ho [2005], Gretzel
& Fesenmaier [2006]). According to Tam & Ho [2005], a user’s willingness to
accept a personalised option is higher when the level of preference matching is
high, thus, the persuasive e ect of the recommendation is higher too. Moreover,
persuasion refers to the influence on the user’s decision, where the precision of
the preference-matching is not the only factor for positive persuasion outcome.
Kaptein et al. [2012] stated that goals, timing and presentation of the recom-
mendation should be considered as persuasive strategies. For example, Nanou
et al. [2010] showed that “structured overview” and “text and video” interfaces
are positively correlated with the persuasion e ect. In this study, authors link
persuasion e ect to the likelihood of selecting recommended options, increase in
users’ self-e cacy and information quality and su ciency to lead users to a deci-
sion. Cosley et al. [2003] presented the recommendations’ tendency to influence
users’ opinions in case of movie recommender systems. Then, while looking at
privacy recommender systems, one might ask “how does privacy recommendation
influence user’s further privacy attitudes and will it shape his future privacy be-
haviour?” As Knijnenburg & Jin [2013] mentioned, “recommender system should
carefully consider the privacy sharing options, because it can influence users to
share significantly more without a substantial di erence in comfort”. Taking into
consideration the possible influence and persuasion power of recommendations
over user’s final privacy decision, the recommender privacy system should care-
fully consider the algorithm in selecting between a sharp or soft recommendation
93
Fuzzy-based Privacy Settings Recommender System
type. The virtue of the recommendation concept already entails a positive per-
ception of the recommended item, if user experienced is a satisfactory interaction
with the recommender (Cremonesi et al. [2012]). The perceived quality of recom-
mendation is an indirect indicator of the potential recommendation’s persuasion
e ect (Cremonesi et al. [2012]). Therefore, if the quality of the recommendation
is satisfying, then the persuasion e ect of the privacy recommendation will be
higher. In our framework, soft recommendations are more accurate than sharp
ones.
Reactance e ect
A reactance e ect upon recommendation options has been scarcely investigated
in the field of recommender systems. A reactance is a user’s negative behaviour
evoked through experiencing a recommended option. If the user feels a threat to
his freedom of choice, then the reactance behaviour can be developed towards the
recommendation advice (Aljukhadar et al. [2017]). Fitzsimons & Lehmann [2004]
suggests that if the recommendation does not meet the user’s initial expectations
about choice options, then he will ignore and act against this recommendation,
thus, expressing his reactance behaviour. Other factors such as perceived exper-
tise level of the recommendation source, situational context and personal char-
acteristics play a role upon the elicited reactance state of the user. Aljukhadar
et al. [2017] discovered that the reactance behaviour alters the level of trust in
a recommendation. However, the trust e ect is, in turn, mediated by the per-
son’s self-construal state. People who look for similarity with others, and have a
high need to socialise and conform to others, are considered to be with an inter-
dependent self-construal state. While users with an independent self-construal
state will be less a ected by the trust in others and, contrarily, they will rely
on their own objective evaluation of the item rather than on the trustworthiness
of the recommender system. Therefore, people with an activated interdependent
self-state tend to have a higher trust in the provided recommendation and, thus,
are more likely to have less reactance behaviour. In contrast, people with ac-
tivated independent self-construal have higher reactance, as they have a lower
trust in recommendations. Thus, three intrinsic characteristics of reactance can
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be delineated: recommendation’s fit to user’s initial expectation, recommender
trustworthiness and user’s self-construal state. The reactance may most proba-
bly appear with privacy recommendations as privacy has more sensitive context
than, for example, e-commerce recommendations. As sharp recommendations
are more inconsistent with a user’s initial expectations, it is assumed that the
sharp recommendation will evoke a user’s higher reactance behaviour than soft
recommendations.
Outcome satisfaction
Outcome satisfaction is the one of main measures of a users’ experience with a
recommender system. Di erent factors influence user’s satisfaction, and it is the
most commonly related to perceived recommendation quality (Knijnenburg et al.
[2011], Pu et al. [2011], Bharati & Chaudhury [2004]). Therefore, the subjective
system aspects of our framework, such as the perceived recommendation quality,
might have an e ect on the user’s recommendation’s satisfaction. In addition,
it is assumed that the perceived recommendation sharpness is associated with
the perceived recommendation quality, thereof the overall satisfaction may also
depend on the recommendation sharpness.
4.3.4 Personal characteristics
Inconsistent/consistent privacy behaviour
Having sharp or soft recommendation types might solve other factors, such as
consistent/inconsistent privacy behaviour which was addressed in the previous
evaluation in Sect. 3.4.4. As an example, for people with consistent privacy
behaviour, where user’s privacy attitude aligns with the actual privacy behaviour,
the system should be very cautious with regards privacy recommendations, thus,
it would be better to provide soft recommendations. In contrast, for people
with an inconsistent privacy behaviour, the sharp recommendation can be an
appropriate solution. As an example, in case when the user’s profile is public,
restrictive recommendation can support them to suggest more restrictive settings.
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4.3.5 Evaluation setup
Experimental Manipulations
The aim of the user experiment is to compare privacy settings recommenda-
tions generated by di erent fuzzy clustering algorithms (FCM with 9 clusters
and PAM with 15 clusters based on Manhattan distance) and users’ own pri-
vacy settings. The clustering-based recommender system is compared against a
non-personalised system, which is represented by the users’ own privacy settings
(baseline of the system). As the recommender system cannot always reassure
the superiority over the non-personalised system, the condition of comparing it
with the proposed baseline becomes relevant (Knijnenburg & Willemsen [2015]).
The two objective systems aspects (FCM- and PAM-based recommendations) are
manipulated in the single experiment, leading to the simultaneous within-subjects
experiment with 2 experimental conditions. Such manipulation allows users to
compare the di erent algorithms and choose the best one they like, including the
baseline proposition (Knijnenburg & Willemsen [2015]). The advantage of this
experiment setting is that subtle di erences between conditions can be detected,
which is highly relevant for the case of this research. The disadvantage of such
experimental settings is that it lacks the realistic presentation of the system,
however, by presenting all options at the same time decreases the feeling of the
experiment.
Experimental Procedures
The participants were recruited via online email invitation (see Sect. C.1, Fig. C.1)
addressed to the users of the Participa Inteligente platform. The same set of users
who participated in the first evaluation study ( Sect. 3.4.4) were invited. In the
email invitation, participants are directed to the website of the user evaluation
application1. The invitation email, the instructions and exercises areas, as well
as the survey questionnaire, were translated into the Spanish language by Prof.
Dr. Luis Teran who is a native Spanish speaker. The user evaluation application
includes the instructions area (see Sect. C.1, Fig. C.2) which explains how to
1https://participacioninteligente.org/survey-privacy
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proceed with the application and the exercise area (see Sect. C.1, Fig. C.3), where
the privacy settings recommendations are presented to the user with the follow-up
survey questionnaire (see Sect. C.1, Table B.2). The first 100 users who completed
the survey received a reward for their participation, a book titled “eDemocracy
& eGovernment. Etapas hacia la sociedad democratica del Conocimiento, por
A.Meier y L. Teran.”
Once the user logged into the exercise area, they were provided with the short
exercise instructions followed by privacy settings recommendations as displayed
in Fig. C.3. As this is a within-subject evaluation, there are three privacy recom-
mendation options presented to the user: “option 1” displays the user’s own initial
privacy settings; “option 2” - recommendation generated by the PAM algorithm
with 15 clusters based on Manhattan distance; “option 3” - recommendation gen-
erated by the FCM algorithm with 9 clusters based on Manhattan distance. The
initial user’s privacy settings are intentionally presented as the recommendation
option in order to have a comparison with a baseline, and also to distinguish those
users who expressed “privacy paradox” behaviour. As such, if the user chose a
privacy recommendation of their own privacy settings values, it means that the
user performs consistent privacy behaviour. At this step, users are asked to select
one privacy recommendation option that they prefer and are then invited to start
a survey within the application. In the next sections, the details of the construct
measurement development are described.
Defining measurements
According to Knijnenburg & Willemsen [2015], while developing the construct it
should maintain the content validity. This means that each construct must consist
of at least three items to preserve its conceptual nature. It is also suggested to
refer to the existing literature when selecting the measurement scale for a specific
construct. However, when introducing the new construct which does not appear
in the existing literature, its content validity should be carefully considered and be
represented with at least with five items. According to the evaluation framework
displayed in Fig. 4.6, the following constructs addressed for the evaluation (see
Sect. C.1, Table B.2): privacy behaviour consistency (PBC), perceived sharpness
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(PSH), perceived quality (PRQ), outcome satisfaction (OS), reactance (RC) and
persuasion (PS). Thus, the questions for the perceived quality have been adapted
from Knijnenburg et al. [2012] and Pu et al. [2011], the persuasion were partially
adapted from Nanou et al. [2010], the reactance have been partially adapted
from Hennig-Thurau et al. [2012]. The perceived sharpness is a new concept
presented for the evaluation of the recommendation, therefore, related questions
were discussed with an expert and reduced to five items. The Likert scale (totally
disagree; disagree; neutral; agree; totally agree) was used for the answer categories
of the questions.
4.3.6 Evaluation analysis
The user evaluation commenced on November 13th, 2017 and ended on January
31st, 2018. The dataset of collected responses consists of 20 participants’ answers.
Among them 17 males and 3 females aged between 21 and 67 years old (median
age is 37.5). Unfortunately, the larger number of participants was not achieved
which poses doubt on the robustness of the statistical analysis based on this
dataset. Therefore, it will be not possible to establish the validity of the proposed
constructs with a small dataset. Admitting the fact that the data does not
attain the statistical significance, the aforementioned hypothesises will not be
approved or rejected. Among the participant’s answers for the chosen privacy
recommendation, 14 users out 20 (70%) chose the first option – which represents
user’s initial privacy settings of her profile, whereas 3 users (15%) preferred to
choose privacy settings suggested by PAM-based algorithm, and the other 3 users
(15%) accepted the recommendation generated by FCM-based algorithm. Fig. 4.7
displays the preliminary results of the collected data.
Perceived quality – on average, users with own and FCM-based privacy set-
tings recommendations score higher on the perceived quality compared to users
with PAM-based recommendations.
Perceived sharpness – the lower the sharpness the higher is the mismatch
of the provided privacy settings recommendations. On average, users perceived
higher mismatch with PAM-based recommendations. Among the users who chose
own privacy settings, 42.8% agreed that the privacy options mismatch with their
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Figure 4.7: Results of each construct per each privacy settings recommendation condition
privacy preferences and 57.1% disagree that recommended privacy options are
similar to their privacy attitudes. Such opinions may indicate users’ inconsistent
privacy behaviour – by stating that the chosen privacy settings do not match
their privacy attitudes, in fact they have chosen their own privacy settings. This
is an example of the paradoxical privacy behaviour, where users attitudes diverge
with their actual privacy preferences. This statement is not statistically justified
but showcases the existence of such behaviour.
Outcome satisfaction – on average, users were equally satisfied with their
own privacy settings and PAM-based privacy settings recommendation. Amongst
users who chose their own privacy settings, 49.9% of them agree that those rec-
ommendations were a waste of the time. It may signify that these users were not
entirely satisfied with provided recommendations (own privacy settings). How-
ever, it is important to encounter that users’ own privacy settings were framed
as “the recommendation provided by the system”, therefore such results can be
biased by the framing e ect. Users who chose FCM-based privacy settings rec-
ommendations are less satisfied compared to other two options.
Reactance – on average, users experienced less reactance with FCM-based
recommendations, and the highest reactance was with PAM-based recommenda-
tions. Among users who chose their own privacy settings, 28.6% expressed to be
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angry with the limited freedom while presented with recommended privacy set-
tings and they felt frustrated in their attempts to make an independent decision.
This may indicate that the majority of participants who chose own privacy set-
tings still experienced the reactance e ect upon receiving this recommendation.
Persuasion – on average, users are highly persuaded with their own privacy
settings, whereas the PAM-based recommendations have the lowest persuasion
e ect. The FCM-based recommendations has slightly lower persuasion compared
to own settings, but higher than PAM-based recommendation. Interesting to
note, that FCM-based recommendation has the lower reactance e ect, and a
higher persuasion e ect.
There should be considered several significant limitations of this user study.
The first limitation is the definition of the constructs with its questionnaire items.
The constructs of the perceived quality and the perceived sharpness in essence
define the accuracy of the provided recommendations. However, this study refers
the quality to the perceived usefulness and the sharpness to the perceived ac-
curacy of the recommendations. To highlight the di erence between these con-
structs, Fig. 4.7 displays that own privacy settings are considered more useful
(higher perceived quality) but less accurate (lower perceived sharpness) com-
pared to algorithm-calculated recommendations. Another example, even with a
high score on the perceived quality and sharpness and consequently less reactance
e ect, users with FCM-based recommendations still scored low on its satisfaction.
The second limitation is the collected number of user responses, which did not
allow to derive statistically significant conclusions. It did not permit to conduct a
reasonable CFA analysis to investigate the discriminant and convergent validity
of the proposed constructs. Moreover, the low N of participation did not al-
low conducting the robust analysis of the baseline (own privacy settings option)
against algorithm-calculated recommendations (14 with own privacy settings ver-
sus 6 with algorithm-based recommendations). The third limitation is that the
participants’ experimental condition was self-selected presented with three op-
tions: users’ own privacy settings framed as a recommendation, FCM-based and
PAM-based privacy settings recommendations. The entire set of participants
were presented with the same list with no randomisation of the choices order,
thus the results was also a ected by the ordering e ect. Therefore, this study
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lacked the counterbalancing procedure. The forth limitation is the users’ under-
standing of the presented visualisation of privacy settings recommendations. Not
every user can understand and interpret the presented visualisation of privacy
settings, therefore the chosen option can be biased, for example by the anchor
e ect. To avoid the understanding issues, the users could be explained how to
interpret the radar charts, so that they could have been accustomed to the use
of such graphs.
This is a first user-centric evaluation framework specifically designed for the
privacy settings recommendations. Its limitations are described above, but the
possible improvements should be considered for the future work. In future, the
clear goal of the user evaluation should be defined. Does the evaluation compare
the baseline system against the one of the algorithm-based recommendation (own
privacy settings versus FCM-based recommendation)? Or the evaluation aims
to compare user experience between two proposed systems (FCM-based versus
PAM-based recommendations)? The clear evaluation goal will then advise the
design of the experiment. If the baseline system to be compared with one of
the algorithm-calculated privacy setting recommendation, then a within-subject
experiment could be conducted. For that, a total size of 31 participants (based
on G power analysis) can produce statistically significant results. To introduce
the counterbalancing e ect half of the sample size can be presented with the first
choice of the baseline system, whereas the other half of participants with the
algorithm-based system as the first option. To evaluate the di erence between
FCM and PAM systems, the between-subject evaluation can be also designed. For
that, a total size of 59 participants (based on G power analysis) will be required,
where each half of participants should be randomly assigned to each condition
either to FCM or to PAM recommendations.
4.4 Conclusions
The insights derived from the user-centric evaluation concluded that di erent
people will perceive the proposed privacy recommendations di erently. All three
conditions (users’ own privacy settings, FCM-based privacy settings, and PAM-
based privacy settings) were presented as “the recommendations calculated by
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the system”. The subjective system aspects like the perceived quality and sharp-
ness of the recommendations scored high on its usefulness and accuracy with the
baseline and FCM-based recommendation. The expressed user experience dif-
fers among participants’ too. Users who chose baseline and FCM-based recom-
mendations had experienced less reactance towards the recommendations, rather
than users who chose PAM-based system. Moreover, the clear distinction can be
observed between PAM-based and FCM-based privacy settings. Users perceived
FCM-based recommendations softer (higher perceived sharpness) and more useful
(higher perceived quality), whereas PAM-based recommendation attained users’
higher outcome satisfaction, but simultaneously a higher reactance state.
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Conclusions
5.1 Discussions
5.1.1 Implication to the public need
This research focused on a problem of citizen’s privacy behaviour on the platform
for political participation called Participa Inteligente. Participa Inteligente (PI)
platform is an academic project that arises from the concern for citizen misinfor-
mation on policy statements and allows citizens to generate spaces for discussion
and participation in topics of interest to the society. This platform aims to en-
hance civic participation and empowerment by providing di erent types of recom-
mendations (political topics, groups, articles and users, among others) according
to the citizens’ needs. This platform expects to facilitate citizens’ decision-making
by giving them more information and resources to debate. However, the extent
to which citizens’ willingness to actively participate on the platform by disclosing
political interests or opinions depends on the personal desire of disclosure.
Accessible regulation of one’s boundaries of private spheres with respect to her
interaction and content sharing with others may influence citizen’s participation
on the platform. This research provided a functional space where users are able
to express their desired level of privacy by explicitly defining privacy settings of
their accounts. Specifically, the designed citizen privacy profile framework de-
termined essential components for building a privacy management tool for an
online platform, where the framework’s components were customized and imple-
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mented to the needs of PI platform and its context. The consequent study has
investigated the use of privacy management tool by citizens from Ecuador which
has showed that the majority of users who created accounts on the platform let
their privacy settings to be public by default. These results readdress the issue
of privacy paradox demonstrating that, indeed, users’ actual decisions of being
private in most cases diverge with their initial privacy intentions.
This thesis entangles information system technologies such as recommender
systems, voting advice applications and privacy by design. Among few privacy
recommender systems, this thesis proposes the conceptual design of a fuzzy-based
privacy settings recommender system, which applies model-based approach using
a real-world dataset of users’ privacy settings. The system was implemented on
PI platform, which is a case of a voting advice application. In the context of the
voting advice applications, the integration of fuzzy-based recommender system
can subsequently not only preserve citizens’ privacy on an automatic basis, but
also facilitate their participation on political matters by releasing their cognition
load from the burden of privacy decision-making. In general, the development
of fuzzy-based privacy settings recommender system involved a full cycle of the
privacy by design approach. Initially, the system was entirely designed to the
needs of the voting advice application, considering the data types generated,
available functionality of privacy management tool, and user population engaged,
prior to the development and launch into the production of the platform itself.
The two artefacts – the citizen privacy profile framework and the prototype of
the fuzzy-based privacy settings recommender system can be adapted by various
organizations. It can be useful functionality for governmental institutions, NGOs,
or private online service providers, and be applied to various cases and situational
contexts, as the components represent the foundational parts of one’s privacy
settings configuration in online space. The utmost utility of both artefacts was
focused on users of the platform, such that by analysing their privacy behaviour to
provide an optimized solution to their privacy settings configurations. Thus, the
central part of the provided solution are the citizens, however, the optimisation
goals might di er depending on the context of the platform. As an example, the
system may not fully automate users’ privacy decision-making, but instead, to
determine a reasonable balance between automation and user’s manual control.
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5.1.2 Implication to the knowledge base
A profound critical analysis of a privacy-related body of research was conducted
(Bélanger & Crossler [2011]; Netter et al. [2013]; Smith et al. [2011]). It revealed
that the majority of studies lacked the design and action research towards actual
implementation (Bélanger & Crossler [2011]). In addition, it is recommended
to utilise a broader diversity of sample populations, such as avoiding using only
student populations, or focusing only on U.S. centric population. The research
presented in this thesis fulfils the outlined critics. First, this thesis focused on
designing an IT artefact based on the conceptual framework presented then with
a practical solution (prototype). Second, the empirical study is based on a di-
verse population which is not limited to the age, gender, occupation (non-student
involved) and focused on Ecuadorian citizens. Third, the analysis of user privacy
behaviour was conducted in the contextual scope of the political participation.
The introduced notion of fuzzy privacy profiles not only extends the knowl-
edge base of privacy domain but also proposes a novel approach of quantifying
user privacy behaviour. By stipulating the multifaceted nature of each individ-
ual, fuzzy privacy profiles encompass all-inclusive underlying patterns of privacy
behaviour in the given dataset. It is a next step further from multidimensionality
to fuzziness of people’s privacy behaviour. Indeed, fuzziness deals with vagueness,
uncertainty and imprecision which are inherent characteristics of privacy decision
making. As John et al. [2010] mentioned, information disclosure is seen as a
decision problem, in which the decision-maker has to trade-o  several uncertain
consequences. Moreover, when individuals are uncertain of their preferences their
decisions can be influenced by contextual cues or cognitive heuristics.
As stated by Von Alan et al. [2004], the design science research addresses
what are considered to be wicked problems. The wicked problem addressed in
this thesis is highly related to “a critical dependence upon human cognitive abil-
ities to produce e ective solutions”. The paradoxical nature of people’s privacy
behaviours can be justified due to a complexity of people’s privacy perceptions
within online environments. Therefore, as shown in Chap. 2, people more often
refer to cognitive abilities in solving privacy-related issues, as opposed to relying
on the rational decisions. Moreover, when dealing with classification of privacy
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types, people usually find it di cult associating themselves with a given label
or class as their attitudes, preferences and decision-making are vague and uncer-
tain by its nature. In such case, applying fuzzy logic facilitates in dealing with
humans’ perceptions and cognitive estimations, thus, providing more accurate
and personalised solutions. The application of fuzzy-based techniques to analyse
user privacy behaviour and the introduction of fuzzy privacy profiles is the first
attempt done by this work. Moreover, no previous studies focused on the user-
centric evaluation of privacy settings recommendations. In addition, the dataset
used for the fuzzy clustering techniques represents a real-world data collected
from PI platform. Compared to previous studies, non-traditional machine learn-
ing methodologies were applied such as Fuzzy C-means and Partitioning Around
Medoids clustering algorithms.
5.1.3 Limitations of the research
During this thesis, several issues were encountered that limited the results of
the research. The amount of the collected dataset of user privacy settings was
comparatively small – it was possible to retrieve only 391 valid user privacy
profiles. Among observations, the majority of profiles were users with default
privacy settings. This reflects people’s behaviour in a real-world environment,
however, it was more challenging to detect patterns while clustering the dataset as
the biggest cluster of users with default privacy settings a ected the classification
of other users, which only slightly di er from the majority.
Privacy profiles, where users’ privacy decisions are the same across all data
types, can be downgraded into a unidimensional representation. This is also
relevant to the case of users with default privacy settings as their all data types
are visible to public. The issue confronted with unidimensional profiles is that
the proposed fuzzy-based privacy settings recommender system fails to calculate
a multidimensional privacy settings recommendation for such profiles. Thus, the
recommender system is valid only for the multidimensional privacy profiles.
While proposing an alternative clustering techniques over a traditional sharp
clustering approaches, this thesis withdraws a detailed comparison of both, fuzzy
and sharp clustering algorithms. An absent comparison of approaches limits to
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scientifically state if the proposed fuzzy methodologies are indeed outperformed
the traditional clustering techniques, thus creating a space for future research to
be done in this direction.
During user-centric evaluations, unfortunately, a su cient amount of the data
from both evaluations – user privacy behaviour and privacy settings recommenda-
tions – was not collected which did not allow to present statistically signification
inferences (only some conclusions could be derived). Additionally, the entire re-
search is restricted to the context of users engaged in the platform for political
participation, where the cultural background of the users is monogamous, thus,
the conclusions from the user-centric evaluations could not be generalised.
5.1.4 Answering research questions
This thesis addressed the existing issues of user privacy behavoir by developing
two artefacts in the context of political participation: the citizen privacy profile
framework and fuzzy-based privacy settings recommender system. The research
questions posed in the beginning of the thesis ( Sect. 1.3) are answered below:
Figure 5.1: Adapted framework of the Ph.D. with research questions.
RQ1. How can a user privacy profile be designed on a platform for political
participation? The citizen privacy profile framework was designed and developed
based on the extensive literature review. In particular, the components of the
framework constitute the general privacy decision making process: the owner of
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the data (User) who possesses her own data (Data levels) and interacts with her
social network (Audience levels) on the platform. At the moment of informa-
tion disclosure the user defines her sharing decision by assigning the status of
“share” or “hide” to a particular data level visible to a chosen audience level.
Such framework defines a simple privacy decision-making process which can be
applied to various applications besides the platforms with the context of political
participation. The framework does not account dynamic parameters of privacy
decision making process (e.g., keeping track of the change over time), therefore,
the privacy profiles on this platform are static.
RQ2. How do fuzzy clustering techniques unveil users’ disclosure behaviour
on a political platform? The research results demonstrated that a majority of
user privacy profiles are multidimensional, if not unidimensional, but undistin-
guishable and di erentiate slightly from other users on particular dimensions. As
a result, it becomes di cult to model user privacy profiles with traditional sharp
approaches as the algorithm should be capable to detect slight di erences. In this
case, fuzzy clustering techniques help to di erentiate among hardly distinguish-
able users. Fuzzy clustering unveiled that multidimensional profiles inherently
have fuzzy nature, where one user can simultaneously belong to several privacy
profiles. By quantifying user privacy behaviour as fuzzy profiles, the hidden infor-
mation on data structure can be retrieved which, in turn, improves the accuracy
and personalisation of privacy settings recommendations.
RQ3. How can an architecture for a fuzzy-based recommender system for pri-
vacy settings be designed? The fuzzy-based privacy settings recommender system
concept was designed and implemented based on the client-server architecture.
Primarily, the parts of the recommender system constitute the components in-
ferred from the fuzzy privacy profiles modelling. The accuracy evaluation of
generated recommendations indicated which clustering models provide the most
accurate recommendations. The proposed architecture does not solve the ques-
tions of scalability and performance e ciency. The essential goal of the system
was to present a novel approach of the fuzzy privacy profiles modelling and the
calculation of privacy settings recommendation. Preliminary results of the user-
centric evaluation demonstrated that on average the fuzzy clustering-based pri-
vacy settings recommendation has the potential to be adopted by users as it had
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a lower reactance e ect from users when compared to the baseline system. Also,
the evaluation results illustrated that the user preference was expressed for the
FCM-based recommendations rather than the PAM-based ones.
RQ4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of applying fuzzy-based ap-
proaches in user privacy-decision making? The scarcity of the data is the biggest
disadvantage for applying machine learning techniques. Indeed, the dataset of
users’ privacy profiles is hard to obtain. This research argues that the fuzzy clus-
tering approach facilitates to precisely quantify the privacy profile models even
with a comparatively small amount of data. One might have a question why the
dimensionality reduction technique was not used. This would be relevant when
dimensionality reduction techniques (e.g. pca, sammon mapping) are needed to
improve visualisation of the data by reducing less variant dimensions. However,
the disadvantage of this is that su cient information can be missed. In contrast,
the goal of this thesis was not to provide a proper visualisation of the dataset, but
to respect the hidden characteristics of every dimension, as the privacy data is
already scarce. Another advantage of fuzzy-based approach over a non-fuzzy one
is that it deals better with an identification of the overlapped cluster structures.
This research reported that fuzzy-based modelling suggests the fine-grained par-
titioning (15 clusters) as well as medium (6 or 9 clusters). A fine-grained solution
might be irrelevant when determining the classification labels (e.g., for defining
privacy persona types), then, in this case, a medium partitioning can be used
while at the same time maintaining information to what degree people belong to
each partition type.
In some situations, privacy automation can go against the user empowerment.
Automation can hold certain risks in terms of its validity and/or ensuing con-
sequences in case of a recommendation adoption. If the user’s actual privacy
behaviour is deviant from his privacy attitudes, then a system model based on
this fallacious data can be considered as unreliable. In this situation, a fuzzy-
based approach has a disadvantage as the models built upon the proposed privacy
framework are static. Static models have a higher risk to overlook the attitude-
behaviour gap issue (privacy paradox). To improve privacy models, dynamic cues,
such as psychological or sociological aspects of users must be considered. An-
other potential risk is that the algorithm can “unintentionally” shape the user’s
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privacy behaviour, which relates to the filter bubble issue (Knijnenburg et al.
[2016]) and/or persuasion e ect (Cremonesi et al. [2012]) of recommendations.
However, by categorising recommendations into sharp or soft types, as it was
proposed in this thesis, it can help to alleviate such problem by balancing the
trade-o  between automation and the users’ manual control.
5.2 Future outlook
People’s privacy behaviour can be faced with uncertainty upon rational privacy
decision as it frequently comes along with overtaxing calculation between the
benefits and risks. It becomes challenging to find an optimal solution between
the level of privacy support automation and the delegation of a privacy control
to its direct owners (users). To reassure the success of such systems intending
to support users’ privacy in online platforms, the following areas needs to be
addressed for future research:
Modelling of user privacy profiles. The modelling of user profiles should go
beyond the rational approaches and multidimensional structure. The first un-
dertaken step was presented by this thesis, proposing a novel quantification of
privacy profiles, by introducing fuzzy privacy profiles. However, relying solely
on the fuzzy profiling is insu cient. Among the contextualisation parameters,
variables such as time, trust and emotion-driven attitudes should be addressed
in more detail. In particular, the emotion-driven user privacy profiling can give
useful insights to the relevance of the privacy recommendations, as well as the
recommendation’s interface design (e.g., nudge, lists, etc.). Emotions are heavily
involved in human’s decision-making processes. As Glimcher & Rustichini [2004]
stated “Emotion would play an important role in decision making not just for
the worst as was then traditional view but for the better. The emotional mal-
function altered the cognitive process. “Emotional” decision making operates
non-consciously, but quite e ectively on parameters of reward, punishment and
risk”. Indeed, the highlighted parameters of reward and risk are essential parts
in the privacy decision-making.
The users’ perceptions towards privacy recommendations. This topic should be
carefully addressed by researchers. Being on the secondary position the role of pri-
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vacy settings, especially of privacy recommendations, is often overlooked. While
shopping online the recommender system that provides products recommenda-
tion may be positively perceived by users as it helps them to accomplish their
initial task. However, while using social networking sites for the communication
with friends, or for professional networking, receiving privacy recommendations
while interacting with the platform may become disturbing and annoying. As
the privacy settings recommendations are not broadly exploited, like the recom-
mendations of products, people, etc., the analysis of users’ perceptions towards
receiving privacy recommendations can provide additional information for the
design of privacy recommender systems. This thesis made the first attempt to
analyse the users’ perception towards privacy recommendations via the persua-
sion and reactance e ect, which needs to be developed in greater detail.
Techniques for calculating privacy recommendations. The modelling of the
user privacy profiles plays an important role in building privacy settings recom-
mender system. The future work can also focus on the accuracy of the fuzzy
privacy profiles by tweaking the parameters of the fuzzy clustering algorithms.
This research has investigated only the di erence between distance norms of algo-
rithms, however, an additional research on tweaking the fuzzification parameter
µ could produce interesting insights about the model accuracy. It should be
noted that the important factor that also needs to be accounted is integration of
user profile change over the time. The self-learning algorithms that build non-
deterministic models which update user privacy profile models could be a possible
panacea for several issues of such recommender system. An example can be the
adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system which builds upon neural networks the
knowledge base of the inference rules. The advantage of such tool against tradi-
tional inference systems is that concepts, such as people’s attitudes or variables
that can be explained in linguistic terms, simultaneously provide the engine for
the automated prediction.
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Appendix A
A.1 Privacy profiles extraction
Figure A.1: MySQL table of Participa Inteligente user privacy settings
Appendix A
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Appendix B
B.1 User evaluation survey for privacy behaviour
Table B.1: User privacy behaviour: survey questions
Number Variable Question Scale
Q1 Use of default
settings (actual)
Did you use the "default" privacy
settings when you registered on
the platform?
Yes; No
Q2 Knowledge Did you know where and how to
change the privacy options on the
platform?
Yes; No
Q3 Frequency How many times did you change
privacy settings of your account?
1; 2; >2
Q4 Use of default
settings (inten-
tion)
You publish all your comments
and articles in "public" mode by
default.
Yes; No
Q5 Ease of use The privacy options on the plat-
form are easy to use.
Totally
disagree
to Totally
agree
Q6 Forget Did you forget to change the pri-
vacy settings in your account?
Yes; No
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B.2 User evaluation survey for privacy recom-
mendations
Table B.2: Privacy recommendations: survey questions
Construct Number Question Likert scale
Privacy
behaviour
consistency
(PBC)
1 My privacy settings are set to public since the regis-
tration on the platform.
Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
2 I haven’t set up privacy settings when created an ac-
count on the platform.
Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
Perceived
sharpness
(PSH)
3 The recommended privacy options di ers from my pri-
vacy attitudes.
Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
4 The recommended privacy options are similar to my
privacy attitudes.
Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
5 Recommended privacy options compromise with my
privacy preferences.
Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
6 The privacy recommendations meet my privacy pref-
erences on the platform.
Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
7 The recommendation options mismatch with my pri-
vacy preferences.
Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
Perceived
quality (PRQ)
8 Recommended privacy settings provide adequate pro-
tection for me.
Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
9 The recommendation gave me good privacy sugges-
tions.
Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
10 The recommended privacy options helped me to reach
my desired privacy on the platform.
Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
Outcome
satisfaction
(OS)
11 The privacy options I saw were a waste of my time. Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
12 I am happy with recommended to me privacy settings. Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
13 I liked recommended privacy options. Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
14 I am not sure if I chose the best privacy settings. Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
Reactance
(RC)
15 I was influenced by the privacy recommendations pro-
vided by the system.
Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
16 I did not feel influenced by the system to select the
privacy recommendation.
Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
17 I was angry with the limited freedom of choice given
by the recommendations.
Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
18 I felt frustrated in my attempts to make independent
privacy decision.
Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
19 I prefer to choose myself privacy settings rather than
being provided with recommendation.
Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
Persuasion
(PS)
20 I selected privacy options recommended to me. Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
21 I skipped privacy options recommended to me. Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
22 I will recommend to a friend to use privacy recommen-
dations.
Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
23 I find privacy recommendation options to be relevant. Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
24 Privacy options were su cient to facilitate my privacy
decision.
Strongly disagree
to Strongly agree
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Appendix C
C.1 User evaluation setup
Figure C.1: Screenshot of the email invitation to participate in the user study
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Figure C.2: Screenshot of the evaluation application instructions
Figure C.3: Screenshot of the exercise area for the user study
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